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ABSTRACT 
Theory of Mind in Children With Autism: 
Is There a Need for Better Tests of What They Know? 
by Alex Karen Proto 
This research looked at the ability of children with autism to understand theory of mind. 
This is the ability to attribute mental states (e.g. believing, thinking, knowing etc.) to 
oneself and to others. The main aim of the study was to provide evidence, contrary to a 
large body of previous research, that individuals with autism can exhibit a theory of mind, 
when the standard tests used in the past are simplified for this population. A further aim of 
the study was to show that language ability is significant in terms of theory of mind task 
performance. It was hypothesised, because of the nature of the theory of mind tasks, that 
matching participants in terms of their understanding of grammar, rather than single word 
understanding (as in past research), would be more appropriate. Three groups took part in 
the study; autistic, learning disabled and normally developing children. The learning 
disabled and normally developing participants were selected to match the subjects with 
autism, in terms of receptive verbal age, on either the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS) or the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG) or both. All the participants were 
given two first order theory of mind tasks; the standard 'Sally-Anne' task, which has been 
used in past research, and a simplified cartoon version of this task designed by the author. 
These first order tasks test the ability to consider another person' s thoughts about an 
objective event. Those participants who passed one of the first order tasks were then given 
three second order theory of mind tasks. These test the abi lity to consider another person ' s 
thoughts about a third person' s thoughts regarding an objective event. The second order 
tasks consisted of the standard ' Ice-Cream Man task ' (used in past research), Sullivan, 
Zaitchik and Tager-Fiusberg' s ( 1994) simplified ' Puppy task ' and a simplified cartoon 
version of the task designed by the author. A significant difference in performance was 
found between the three participant groups (matched on the BPVS) on the standard first 
order task, but not on the simplified first order task. A significant difference in 
performance was found between the participant groups on the standard Ice-Cream Man 
task and the Puppy task, when matched on the BPVS, but not when matched on the TROG. 
In addition no significant difference in performance was found between the autistic and 
learning disabled participants on any of the theory of mind tasks. These fmdings are 
discussed in relation to other explanations of autism such as the salient object hypothesis 
and executive function. 
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1.1 Definitions 
Autism 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
Autism is a developmental disorder, which affects about four in every I 0 000 children, and 
was first described as a syndrome by Kanner in 1943. DSM-IV defines autism as a severe 
form of Pervasive Developmental Disorder, and describes the following four main 
diagnostic criteria: qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction; qualitative 
impairment in verbal and non-verbal communication and in imaginative activity; a 
markedly restricted repertoire of activities and interests and onset during infancy or 
childhood. 
Asperger's Syndrome 
The term Asperger' s syndrome was first used by Wing (1981) who listed the following six 
diagnostic criteria based on Asperger ( 1944 ): speech was not delayed, but pedantic, 
stereotyped and odd in content; poor non-verbal communication in terms of little facial 
expression, monotone voice and inappropriate gesture; lacking empathy and non-
reciprocal in social interactions; resistant to change, enjoying repetitive activities; poor 
motor co-ordination involving odd gait and posture, clumsy gross movements and 
sometimes stereotypies; good rote memory and circumscribed special interests. 
Theory of Mind 
Numerous hypotheses, to account for the specific impairments seen in autism, have been 
proposed. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith ( 1995) proposed that a single cognitive deficit 
could underlie the three diverse features of autism (impairments in socialisation, 
communication and imagination). Their theory suggests that people within the autistic 
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spectrum are impaired in their acquisition and use of a ' theory of mind'. The term ' theory 
of mind' was coined by Premack and Woodruff ( l978) and defmed as the ability to impute 
mental states (e.g. believing, thinking, knowing, pretending etc.) to oneself and to others. 
J .2 Autism and an Impaired Theory of Mind 
lt has been argued that many of the impairments observed in autism are explicable in terms 
of an impaired understanding of mental states. People with autism have been found to have 
di fficu lty in comprehending certain facial , bodily and vocal expressions of emotion in 
others (Hobson, 1986). In addition they themselves tend not to use gestures to express or 
communicate mental states e.g. pointing to draw someone' s attention to an object 
(Attwood, Frith & Hermelin, 1 988~ Leslie & Happe, 1 989). A striking lack of pretend play 
is also exhibited by the vast majority of children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1987) and 
such play is thought to be a precursor to a theory of mind. More evidence to support the 
idea that individuals with autism lack a theory of mind comes from studies of their 
language. It has been found that they tend not to use mental state terms in their 
spontaneous speech (Tager-Flusberg, 1992) and do not reliably take account of a listener's 
knowledge when communicating (Pemer, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989). 
1.3 Traditional 'Theory of Mind' Tasks 
First Order Theory of Mind 
It has been argued that it is not until one demonstrates an understanding of false belief 
(where mental state conflicts with reality) that one can unequivocally attribute a theory of 
mind to an individual (Dennett, 1978). Wimrner and Pemer (1983) were the first to 
incorporate the idea of testing an understanding of false belief into an empirical test of 
theory of mind. This was later adapted by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) into the 'Sally-Anne 
task', and employed with children with autism. The Sally-Anne task tests an understanding 
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of what is called first order theory of mind, which is the ability to consider another 
person's thoughts about an objective event, and is normally passed by children at about 4 
years of age (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). The task involves a scenario in which Sally's 
marble is moved, during her absence, and on her return the child is asked to predict where 
Sally will look for her marble. In order to answer this question correctly, the child must 
take account of the fact that Sally does not know her marble has been moved, and so must 
still believe it to be in its original location (i.e. the child must have knowledge of Sally's 
false belief). 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) found that 80 per cent of their sample of autistic subjects 
answered the false belief question incorrectly, stating that Sally would look for her marble 
in its actual location. In contrast, 85 per cent of normally developing 4 year olds and 86 per 
cent of the group of children with Down syndrome passed this test of false belief Baron-
Cohen et al. ( 1985) argued that this failure of the autistic group could not be attributed to 
inattention, memory problems, linguistic or motivational factors, since all subjects were 
able to correctly answer the memory and reality control questions (about the original and 
current location of the marble). This pattern of results has been replicated on numerous 
occasions using many different methodological techniques (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Leekam 
& Pemer, 1991; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Reed & Patterson, 1990; Shaw, 1989; Swettenham, 
1992). 
The majority of subjects with autism have been found to fail first order belief attribution 
tests, but in each study there is a proportion (between 15 and 90 per cent) who are 
successful in demonstrating a theory of mind, even if delayed in doing so (Dahlgren & 
Trillingsgaard, 1996; Reed & Patterson, 1990). This must lead one to question whether a 
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theory of mjnd deficit can fully account for the impairments seen in autism, since clearly a 
lack of understanding of minds is not inevitable in autism. 
Second Order Theory of Mind 
Baron-Cohen (1989) showed that none of the autistic subjects who passed the Sally-Anne 
task in the 1985 study could, however, pass a slightly more advanced test known as the 
' Ice-Cream Man task' . Trus tests understanding of second order theory of mind, that is the 
ability to consider another person' s thoughts about a thjrd person 's thoughts about an 
objective event, and is normally passed by children at about 5-7 years of age. Baron-
Cohen's (1989) study showed that whilst none of the autistic subjects passed the Ice-
Cream Man task, 90 per cent of the normally developing subjects and 60 per cent of the 
Down Syndrome subjects passed trus task. There was no significant difference between the 
normally developing and Down Syndrome subject groups in their performance on this task. 
The Ice-Cream Man task involves a story about two characters, John and Mary, who are 
informed together about the location of an ice-cream van. John and Mary are then 
independently told about the ice-cream van' s unexpected transfer to a new location. Hence 
both characters, at the end of the story, know where the van is really located, but Mary 
does not know that John knows the van has moved. Thus, by asking subjects where Mary 
thinks John will go to buy an ice-cream, one can test understanding of second order belief 
attribution. It has been stated that it is only when one has the capacity to attribute second 
order mental states, that one can have a sophisticated understanding of human behaviour 
(Sullivan, Zaitcruk & Tager-Fiusberg, 1994). 
A number of more recent studies have produced mixed results when companng the 
performance of subjects with autism or Asperger' s syndrome with controls on second 
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order theory of mind tasks. Consistent with Baron-Cohen' s 1989 study, Ozonoff, 
Pennington and Rogers ( 1991) reported that subjects with autism were significantly worse 
than controls on second-order theory of mind tasks. Other researchers, however, have 
reported finding no significant difference between subjects on the autistic spectrum and 
normal or learning disabled controls in their ability to attribute second order beliefs 
(Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington, 1991 ; Tager-Fl usberg & Sullivan, 1994a.) 
In Bowler' s 1992 study it was found that the majority of individuals with Asperger' s 
syndrome were able to pass the theory of mind tasks. It was reported, though, that on the 
whole they did not use cognitive state terms (i.e. thinking, knowing, believing) in their 
responses, and none referred explicitly to the beliefs of both characters in the story. These 
findings, however, were similar for the two control groups in the study. Bowler believed 
that it was certain features in the story that focused the subject's attention on non-mental 
explanation's of people's behaviour. Since when he examined the answers given to the 
justification question in the Ice-Cream Man task (namely ' Why does Mary think that about 
John' ), a large number of subjects stated that the ice-cream man was in the park at the 
beginning of the story, or that he said he would be there all afternoon. Thus subject's 
answers centred on the point in the story at which the false belief is set up. 
Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard (1 996) employed the Sally-Anne and Ice-Cream Man tasks 
with three matched groups of subjects: those with autism, those with Asperger' s syndrome 
and normally developing individuals. The results showed that 90 per cent of the subjects 
with autism, 85 per cent of those with Asperger' s syndrome and all of the normally 
developing control subjects passed the first order theory of mind task. In addition 60 per 
cent of the subjects with autism and Asperger's syndrome and 90 per cent of the controls 
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passed the second order theory of mind task. No statistically significant differences were 
found between the three groups on the theory of mind tasks. 
1.4 Criticisms of the Methodology Used in Theory of Mind Tasks 
Several criticisms have been made of the methodology of ' theory of mind' false belief 
tasks as described below: 
Salient Object Hypothesis 
It has been hypothesised that, in false belief tasks, people with autism may have difficulty 
overcoming the perceptual salience of the object in the reaJ location. Baron-Cohen' s 
(1989) second order theory of mind task involves the use of a model village to act out a 
scenario. The test question asks ' Where does Mary think John has gone to buy his ice-
cream' and the correct answer, taking account ofMary's false belief about John's belief, is 
in the park. At the end of the story when the question is asked, however, the ice-cream van 
is visibly outside the church and therefore likely to be a distraction. 
Russell , Mauthner, Sharpe and Tidswell (1991 ) designed a task called ' the windows task' 
to test autistic children's ability to deceive, which involves the abil.ity to manipulate 
another person' s thoughts. The windows task requires the subject to compete against the 
experimenter for chocolate and comprises of two phases. Initially, in the training phase, 
the subject must point to one of two closed boxes, and if the chosen box contains a 
chocolate the experimenter gets it, whereas if the box is empty then the subject gains the 
chocolate. In phase two the boxes have windows facing the subject, so that onJy s/he 
knows the true location of the chocolate, and following the same rules as previously the 
subject must select a box. It is obviously in the subject's best interest to deceive the 
experimenter and point to the empty box, in order to obtain the chocolate for themselves. 
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Russell et al. ( 1991) found that the majority of children with autism, and the younger non-
autistic children aged less than 4 years old, pointed to the box containing the chocolate for 
all 20 trials in the second phase. It seems that such perseveration shown by the autistic 
children on this task is more easily explained as a failure to inhibit reference to the salient 
object (i.e. a difficulty in drawing one' s attention away from where a desired object is 
present in order to refer to an empty location). If the children with autism had simply not 
understood the task one might expect more random responding, and it is difficult to see 
how a deficit in theory of mind could explain why autistic children are so unresponsive to 
negative feedback. 
Hughes and Russell (1993) used a modified version of the windows task with two groups 
of subjects, children with autism and those with learning difficulties. They found that, in 
comparison with the non-autistic learning disabled subjects, the autistic subjects had 
difficulty pointing to the empty box even in a condition with no competitor. This supports 
the claim that individuals with autism have a problem disengaging from a salient object, 
since an explanation in terms of lack of a theory of mind does not make sense in a 
situation where there was no other mind in which to implant a false belief. 
Further evidence in support of the salient object hypothesis comes from an earlier study by 
Wimmer and Perner (1983), showing that young non-autistic children also find it difficult 
to ignore a salient object. Wimmer and Pemer (1983) adapted the original ' Sally-Anne 
task' into a story about a boy called Maxi and his mother, which is acted out using dolls 
and other props. In the first version of the story Maxi puts some chocolate away in the blue 
cupboard and then leaves the house. In his absence his mother bakes a cake, using some of 
the chocolate and then puts the rest away in the green cupboard. When Maxi returns to the 
house, the subject is asked where Maxi will look for the chocolate. In another version of 
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the story, namely the 'disappear' condition, Maxi ' s mother uses up all of the chocolate in 
making the cake, so there is none left to transfer to another location. When acted out the 
chocolate is in fact removed from the scene and placed behind a wall, and on Maxi ' s 
return subjects are asked where Maxi will look for the chocolate. There was a group of 
children who failed this false belief task, and out of this group 85 per cent claimed that 
Maxi would look behind the wall for the chocolate. ln trus situation the actual physical 
location of the chocolate is clearly over-riding either of the other two locations (i.e. the 
blue and green cupboards) in the task. 
Gopnik (1989) also provided evidence for the salience hypothesis, employing normally 
developing 3 year olds as subjects. It was found that these subjects performed significantly 
better on a pretence change experiment than a belief change task. In the belief change task 
the subject is shown a box of smarties and asked what s/he thinks it contains. To the 
subject' s surprise the box is opened and found to contain pencils, and the test question is 
then asked ' Before I opened the box, what did you think was inside?' The pretence change 
task involves the chi ld initially being asked to pretend that an object, for example a stick, 
is a spoon and then later the chi ld is told to pretend it is another object such as a magic 
wand. When asked the test question ' What were you pretending the object was before?' 
subjects were more able to answer it correctly than when asked a similar question in the 
belief change task. Gopnik argued that the pretence change task is easier for subjects, 
because when asked the test question there was no actual magic wand present (salient 
object) to distract them. 
ln trus piece of research the Sally-Anne and Ice-Cream Man tasks have been adapted, by 
using cartoon drawings to tell the story rather than acting the scenarios out with a model 
and puppets. The use of drawings means that the true physical location of the salient object 
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will be less distracting, since it will not be visible. Therefore subjects will not have to give 
a response to a question such as, 'Where does Mary think John has gone to buy an ice-
cream?' which directly contradicts the visible evidence. 
Information Processing Load 
It has also been argued that individuals with autism may fail at false belief tasks because of 
an inability to process all the information, rather than due to a deficit in theory of mind. 
Various researchers have shown that by modifying (simplifying) both the standard first and 
second order theory of mind tasks more subjects, or individuals of a younger age, can be 
shown to possess a theory of mind. Such results raise the question of whether the difficulty 
people with autism have with theory of mind tasks represent a task artefact rather than a 
genuine deficit in theory of mind. 
Eisenmajer and Prior ( 1991) tested children with autism on the Sally-Anne task, and those 
who fai led were given an additional trial in which the word ' first' was included in the false 
belief question: ' Where will Sally first look for the marble?' It was found that half the 
subjects who had initially failed the false belief task were able to pass when this alteration 
was made. It has been argued that since the order of trials was not counterbalanced in this 
study, practice effects could cause the results. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994b) tested 
out this possibility by counterbalancing the order of presentation of tasks, and found no 
evidence of practice effects. Similarly Sullivan et al. (1994) found no practice effects in 
their study. 
Other studies have modified the standard second order theory of mind task. Sullivan et al. 
( 1994) aimed to explain the developmental Jag between understanding first order and 
second order beliefs, such understanding normally occurs at about 4 years and 6-7 years 
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respectively. One hypothesis that they proposed was that younger children may not have 
the language skills necessary to understand the second order false belief question, which 
contains a double embedded proposition ' Where does Mary think John has gone ... ?' 
Alternatively they suggested that chiJdren younger than 6 or 7 years may lack the 
information processing resources necessary to solve second order theory of mind tasks, or 
that a conceptual breakthrough is made around 6 years of age. 
In order to test these hypotheses Sullivan et al. (1994) gave normally developing 4-8 year 
olds four stories involving second order belief attribution. Two stories were based on 
Pemer and Wimmer' s (1985) lee-Cream Man task, but these were slightly shorter than the 
original scenario and prompt questions and a memory aid question were added to ensure 
the chi ld was attending to the story. The other two stories were newly designed and also 
included a memory aid and prompt questions. In addition the latter stories were made 
simpler than the original task by employing fewer characters, episodes and scenes and by 
including a deceptive context. A linguistic control question, containing a double 
embedding, was also added to each scenario: 'Does John know that the ice-cream man told 
Mary he was going to the school?' 
The main findings of this study were that significantly more subjects passed the new 
stories than the standard stories, and that 40 per cent of the under 5 year olds were able to 
attribute second order false beliefs. These findings show that children of a younger age 
than previously demonstrated can exhibit second order belief attribution. Perner and 
Wimmer ( 1985) found children were unable to attribute second order beliefs until 6 or 7 
years old, and in a much earlier study Barenboim (1978) found no child under the age of 
11 was able to make second order belief attributions. In conclusion the modifications made 
in this study to Pemer and Wimmer' s (I 985) Ice-Cream Man task significantly improved 
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children's performance, thus supporting the hypothesis that younger children lack the 
information processing resources to solve second order theory of mind tasks. 
Leekam and Prior ( 1994) tested a group of autistic subjects and a control group of 
normally developing children on a version of the Ice-Cream Man task, and also on several 
stories to assess understanding of the distinction between joking and deceitful lies. 
Surprisingly, they found that there was no difference between the autistic and normally 
developing children' s performance on the test questions. In addition Leekam and Prior 
found that the majority of normally developing subjects, by the age of 5 years, were able to 
demonstrate an understanding of second order beliefs and intentions. These results again 
support the idea that if the theory of mind task is made simpler (i.e. the information-
processing load is reduced) then children of a younger age and more subjects with autism 
can pass. In this study a series of illustrations was used alongside each story being told by 
the experimenter, and when the test question was asked, subjects had to point to one of 
two pictures to answer. This meant that not only was there no salient object to disengage 
from, j ust two pictures to compare, but also in the final picture in the Ice-Cream Man task, 
the ice-cream van was positioned halfway between the park and church. Leekam and Prior 
( 1994) argued that in terms of the salient object hypothesis this change in methodology 
could also have been beneficial to subjects. 
Tager-Fiusberg and Sullivan (l994a) also hypothesised that second order theory of mind 
tasks pose a difficulty for autistic, learning disabled and young normally developing 
children because of the added information processing load. They tested this hypothesis by 
employing a ' simpler' second order theory of mind task, with matched groups of autistic 
and learning disabled subjects. This ' simpler' task will be referred to as the 'Puppy' task, 
and was designed by Sullivan et al. ( 1994). The results of this study showed that the 
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majority of subjects in both groups passed the new task, and there were no significant 
differences in performance between the autistic and learning disabled subjects on this task. 
It might be, however, that careful matching of subjects on their understanding of grammar 
and sentences, rather than matching simply on the basis of single word vocabulary as used 
in past research, eliminated any potential group differences. 
In this study it is proposed that representing the theory of mind tasks as cartoon pictures, 
with the story written underneath the drawings, will ease the information-processing load 
for children with autism. There will be fewer distractions with the cartoons, as subjects 
will not have to follow a story presented verbally whilst watching a number of puppets and 
objects move around. Boucher and Lewis (1989) found that when children with autism are 
following instructions, they make significantly more errors when such instructions are 
presented either verbally or visually demonstrated, than when they are written down. 
A number of past researchers have already shown that by reducing the information 
processing load more children with autism can be shown to pass theory of mind tasks. It is 
not until one compares performance on these 'simpler' theory of mind tasks with 
performance on the traditional tasks employing the same group of subjects, however, that 
one can unequivocally know the role information processing plays in these tasks. Since it 
could be claimed that studies demonstrating a higher percentage of passers might have 
used particularly able groups of autistic subjects. 
The Role of Verbal Ability in Theory of Mind Tasks 
Several researchers have suggested that verbal ability may be linked to an autistic 
individual ' s performance on theory of mind tasks, but the results are equivocal. Many 
studies have shown a relationship between verbal mental age and false belief task 
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performance (Baron-Cohen, 1989~ Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992~ Eisenmajer & Prior, 
1991 ~ Frith, Happe & Siddons, 1994~ Happe, 1993~ Leekam & Perner, 1991 ~ Prior, 
Dablstrom & Squires, 1990~ Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995) whilst others have found no 
evidence for such a link (Baron-Cohen, 1989~ Baron-Cohen et al. , 1985 ~ Leslie & Frith, 
1988~ Pemer et al., 1989.) Prior et al. (1990) stated that a certain level of verbal ability is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for task success. Happe (1995) found, however, that not onJy 
is some minimal verbal mental age necessary for success on theory of mind tasks, but that 
there is also a higher verbal mental age (11 years 7 months) above which all subjects pass 
these tasks. 
The majority of studies examining the relationship between theory of mind and verbal age 
have used relatively small sample sizes, which may account for the inconsistent results that 
have been found. Happe ( 1995) collated data on age, verbal mental age, verbal IQ and 
theory of mind test performance for 70 individuals with autism, of widely varying ages and 
ability levels. She found a strong and significant relationship between theory of mind task 
success and verbal ability. 
Ifthere is a certain verbal mental age above which all subjects with autism can pass theory 
of mind tasks, why is it so much higher than that required by normally developing 
children? It may be that some other factor can account for better verbal ability and theory 
of mind task performance e.g. motivation or teaching. Bowler (1992) suggested that 
individuals with Asperger' s syndrome might be passing theory of mind tasks in a verbally 
mediated fashion. Bowler stated that ' although people with Asperger's syndrome can 
compute correct solutions to problems requiring a theory of mind, they do so by routes that 
are slow and cumbersome, disrupting the timing of their responses and making them 
appear odd in everyday social interactions'. 
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A criticism of the methodology of theory of mind tasks is that predominantly in past 
research subjects have been matched on the basis of vocabulary comprehension, using 
either the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) or, the later version, the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982), yet most tasks 
require understanding of complex grammatical sentences. It would therefore seem more 
appropriate to assess understanding of sentences, since development of grammatical 
competence may be slower than vocabulary. Indeed many autistic children who develop 
language can acquire large vocabularies, of the concrete kind, which are assessed in 
picture vocabulary tests (Frith, 1989a). Whilst subjects with autism are able to answer 
correctly control questions in theory of mind tasks, it may be that the test question is 
prab7JI1atically or grammatically more difficult to answer. 
Tager-Fiusberg and Sullivan (1994b) assessed the performance of three matched groups of 
subjects (autistic, learning disabled and older normally developing children) on first order 
theory of mind tasks based on Wimmer and Pemer' s (1983) Sally-Anne task. They aimed 
to explore the relationship between grammatical comprehension and theory of mind task 
performance, by matching subjects not only on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS) but also on a test of syntax, using the Sentence Structure subtest of the Clinical 
Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF; Semel, Wiig & Secord, 1987). It was found 
that 90 per cent of the subjects with autism passed the false belief task, and no significant 
difference in performance was found between the autistic and learning disabled groups. In 
addition it was reported that for autistic subjects there was a strong relationship between 
performance on the theory of mind tasks and performance on the CELF. Scores on the 
BPVS were not related to theory of mind task performance for either group of subjects. 
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1.5 Shortcomings of the 'Theory of Mind' Explanation of Autism 
The 'Talented Minority' 
Research has suggested that the core impairments seen in autism can be explained in terms 
of a single cognitive deficit, namely a lack of ' theory of mind', however, this theory has 
been challenged, on a number of accounts. Firstly, as mentioned previously, by the finding 
that in every study a proportion of subjects with autism have been found to possess a 
theory of mind, when tested on standard tasks, and yet they remain socially impaired. 
Frith, Morton and Leslie (1991) suggest that those autistic individuals who are able to pass 
false belief tasks have achieved this by ' hacking out' a solution, using general problem 
solving skills and not a theory of mind. Such a strategy may be inflexible, and whilst 
allowing success on relatively simple and artificial tests, it would not be as useful in real 
life situations. One such problem solving strategy, would be to associate the person with 
the object and place in the story, e.g. in the Sally Anne task to link Sally-marble-basket. 
Such a strategy would allow an individual to pass the Sally Anne task, without an 
understanding of minds, but would not generalise to real life 'mentalising' skills such as 
keeping secrets (Happe, 1994a.) 
Baron-Cohen ( 1989) has proposed a developmental argument, that although some children 
with autism develop a theory of mind, they do so much later than other children. He stated 
that no autistic child has yet been found to pass theory of mind tests at the normal mental 
age. It has been suggested, therefore, that even those individuals who develop a theory of 
mind will have abnormalities in using it, even if only subtle ones (e.g. in social interactions 
and communication), because of developing the skills later than normal. 
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Failure on Theory of Mind Tasks is Not specific to Autism 
The majority of research examining theory of mind performance in individuals with autism 
has included a control group of learning disabled subjects. In each of these studies a 
number of learning disabled individuals have failed to show that they possess a theory of 
mind. In Baron-Cohen et al. 's I 985 study, 14 per cent of the group with Down Syndrome 
failed to solve the first order theory of mind task, suggesting that the deficit may not be 
specific to autism. 
In addition three studies have found no significant difference between learning disabled 
and autistic children on a number of standard theory of mind tasks (Oswald & Ollendick, 
1989; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994b; Yirmiya & Shulman, 1996.) This was despite the 
fact that these studies used children with a lower average IQ score than those participating 
in Baron-Cohen et al.'s (1985) study, who found that there was a significant difference 
between these groups. It could not be argued, therefore, that the former findings were a 
result of a selective bias towards more able autistic individuals. 
Several studies have also compared the performance of individuals with learning 
disabilities (but not autism) with normally developing individuals, on both first and second 
order theory of mind tasks. Sodian and Frith ( 1992 ), Benson, Addeduto, Short, N uccio and 
Maas (I 993) and Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto and Frye (I 996) all found that subjects with a 
learning disability performed worse than matched normally developing controls on theory 
of mind tasks. 
The above mentioned studies have shown that children with learning difficulties have 
problems with theory of mind. Research has also indicated problems in this ability in 
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children with other communication difficulties e.g. deaf children (Peterson & Siegal, 1995 ~ 
Russell, Hosie, Gray, Scott, Hunter, Banks & Macaulay, 1998). 
The Theory of Mind Hypothesis Cannot Explain All Features of Autism 
The 'theory of mind' account does seem to offer an explanation for the triad of 
impairments in social interaction, communication and play seen in autism. There is more 
to autism, however, than the classic triad of impairments. People with autism frequently 
present with a strikingly uneven profile of abilities, with islets of ability as well as 
impairments needing an explanation. Happe ( 1994b) summarised the findings from 10 
studies examining the profile, of subjects with autism, across the subtests of the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scales (Weschler~ 1974, 1981 ). These studies all showed a peak in 
performance on the Block Design subtest and a trough on the Comprehension subtest. This 
pattern of results has been found in both high and low functionjng individuals with autism 
(Shah & Frith, 1993), in children and adults with autism (Freeman, Lucas, Forness & 
Ritvo, 1985~ Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988) and those with Asperger' s syndrome (Bowler, 
1992). Such islets of ability cannot easily be explained by a lack of a theory of mind, nor 
can a number of other aspects of autism such as a restricted repertoire of interests, 
obsessive desire for sameness, excellent rote memory and preoccupation with parts of 
objects (Frith & Happe, 1994). 
To conclude, it would seem that a deficit in theory of mind is not specific to autism, nor 
can thls theory account for all people with autism or all features of autism. 
1.6 Alternative Theories 
There have been two other main theories proposed to account for autism, other than the 
theory of mind explanation. These other theories are that of central coherence and 
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executive function, each of which shall be described in turn. Whilst this study does not 
attempt to address either of these other theories, it may be that they will need to be given 
further consideration if an impairment of theory of mind in autism is shown to be a test 
artefact, and/or not specific to this population. 
Central Coherence 
Frith ( 1989b) proposed an alternative theory to try to explain both the strengths and 
impairments found in autism. A characteristic of normal information processing seems to 
be the tendency to consolidate different pieces of information, in order to derive higher-
level meaning in context, for example the gist of a story is easily recalled whilst the exact 
details are usually not. Frith termed this natural inclination to form connections over as 
wide a range of stimuli as possible, and to generalise over as wide a range of contexts as 
possible ' central coherence' . She proposed that this was disturbed in autism, leading to a 
specific impairment in extracting meaning in context, and a preference for processing local 
rather than global information. Frith predicted, therefore, that autistic subjects would be 
relatively good at tasks where fragmented processing is advantageous, but poor at tasks 
requiring the recognition of global meaning. 
An impairment in central coherence could account for the supenor performance of 
subjects with autism for their mental age, reported by Shah and Frith ( 1983), on the 
Embedded Figures test, which involves finding a small target shape in a drawing of a 
larger meaningful shape made up of confusing lines. Similarly the Block Design subtest of 
the W AIS-R, which people with autism have been found to excel at, requires subjects to 
break down a geometric shape into smaller shapes, in order to copy the design using small 
building blocks. Shah and Frith (1993) found that modifying the Block Design stimuli by 
pre-segmenting the designs, had little effect on the performance of children with autism, 
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but in contrast greatly improved the performance of learning disabled and normally 
developing children. Further, more anecdotal evidence for a disturbance in central 
coherence comes from a single case study by Mottron and Belleville (1993) of an autistic 
man with exceptional artistic ability. They noted that the subject began his pictures by 
drawing one small detail and then continued by adding adjoining parts of the picture, 
whereas a professional draughtsman who acted as a control started by drawing an overall 
outline of the whole picture and then added the various parts. 
The central coherence theory does seem to account for some of the unusual strengths 
shown by people with autism, but it also needs to explain their impairments. Frith and 
Snowling (1983) gave chi ldren with autism a number of sentences containing homographs 
(words with the same spelling as another but with a different meaning) to read. In order to 
pronounce the words correctly, one must process the homograph as part of the whole 
sentence meaning e.g. ' He had a pink bow' and 'He made a deep bow' . They found that 
compared to a group of dyslexic chi ldren and those without a learning disability of the 
same reading age, the autistic children read fewer words correctly and tended to give the 
more frequent pronunciation regardless of the sentence context. There are a number of 
other experimental findings, which cannot be accounted for by the theory of mind 
explanation of autism, but can be explained by a lack of central coherence. Frith and 
Hermelin ( 1969), for example, found that autistic subjects had an unusual strength for 
completing jigsaw puzzles by shape, but an unusual weakness for completing them by 
picture. It has also been found that children with autism can sort faces better by accessories 
than by emotion (Weeks & Hobson, 1987.) Similarly Tager-Flusberg (1991) found that 
autistics have an unusual strength in terms of remembering unrelated items, but an unusual 
weakness in memory for related items. 
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Central coherence may be useful in explaining some of the real-life features of autism, as 
well as making sense of a number of experimental findings that cannot be accounted for by 
a theory of mind deficit. Several researchers have explored the links between central 
coherence and theory of mind. Happe ( 1991 ) found that a group of autistic subjects 
performed poorly on Snowling and Frith's (1986) homograph reading test irrespective of 
level of theory of mind understanding. Even those subjects who consistently passed all the 
theory of mind tasks ilid not use the sentence context to aid pronunciation of the 
homographs. Happe (1994b) looked at the WISC-R and WAIS profiles of a group of 
inilividuals with autism, in comparison with their performance on a standard first order 
theory of mind task. She found that subjects ' good performance on the non-verbal tasks, 
which benefit from weak central coherence (e.g. Block Design), was independent from 
theory of mind task success. In contrast, social reasoning deficits (e.g. poor perfonnance 
on the Comprehension subtest) were striking only in those subjects who failed the theory 
of mind tasks. Frith and Happe ( 1994) have suggested that the central coherence 
hypothesis might be useful in supplementing the theory of mind account of autism, in 
terms of explaining the persisting social impairments of the talented minority. It may be 
that a theory of mind, which is not fed by rich and integrated contextual information, is of 
little use in everyday life. 
Executive Function 
Damasio and Maurer ( 1978) were the first to highlight the similarities between the effects 
of frontal lobe damage and autism. Specifically 'executive functions ', which are associated 
with the frontal lobes, have been thought to be impaired in autism. Executive function is 
defined as the abi lity to maintain an appropriate problem-solving set for attainment of a 
future goat it includes behaviours such as planlling, impulse control, inhibition of 
prepotent but irrelevant responses, set maintenance, orgarused search and flexibility of 
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thought and action. Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers ( 1991) noted that some features of 
autism are reminiscent of executive function deficits. Autistic children are rigid and 
inflexible and may become distressed at change. Their repetitive and stereotyped actions 
may be likened to the response perseveration seen in frontal lobe patients. Autistic 
individuals do not plan or anticipate long-term consequences, and appear not to reflect or 
self monitor. They frequently appear impulsive and unable to inhibit prepotent but 
irrelevant responses. 
Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers (1991) compared a group of high-functioning autistic 
children with a group of control children on a number of tasks: namely theory of mind, 
executive function, emotion perception, memory and spatial tasks. They used the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and the Tower of Hanoi task to assess executive 
function. The WCST requires the subject to deduce a rule, which is periodically changed, 
for sorting cards either by colour, shape or number, using feedback from the assessor about 
the correctness of each sort. In the Tower of Hanoi task the subject must reproduce a 
configuration of discs on three pegs, keeping to certain rules which in effect require moves 
to be planned in advance. The two most widely spread deficits in the autistic group were in 
executive function and second order theory of mind. In general, however, executive 
function was the best discriminator between the two groups. Other researchers have also 
found that autistic subjects and those with Asperger' s syndrome perform poorly on 
standard tests of executive function (Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington, 1991 ; Prior & 
Hoffmann, 1990; Rumsey, 1985; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988, 1990; Steel, Gorrnan & 
Flexman, 1984.) 
Goodman (1989) has suggested that it may be misguided to look for one pnmary 
impairment that can account for a1l symptoms of autism. Ozonoff, Rogers and Pennington 
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( 1991) found that whilst subjects with a diagnosis of Asperger' s syndrome were not 
impaired on theory of mind tests, they showed executive function deficits like the other 
autistic subjects in their study. They therefore argued that executive function deficit was 
more likely, than a theory of mind deficit, to be the primary impairment in autism. They 
did discuss, however, possible links between the two deficit theories and hypothesised that 
executive function deficits may be the result of a lack of theory of mind, or vice versa, or 
that both may result from a third factor. 
1. 7 The Aims of the Study 
The main aim of this research is to provide further evidence to support the idea that people 
with autism do possess a theory of mind. It will be argued that the theory of mind tests 
traditionally used in past research, however, need to be modified to allow this ability to be 
exhibited. 
A number of researchers have shown that by simplifying the theory of mind tasks in some 
manner, allows more individuals or younger subjects to pass (e.g. Leekam & Prior, 1994~ 
Sullivan et al., 1994~ Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994a.) None of these studies, however, 
compared performance on the traditional theory of mind task with that on the modified 
version, using the same groups of subjects. Thus it could be argued that it was possible for 
them to have selected particularly able participants in their studies. 
This study therefore aims to compare the performance of subjects on the traditional ' Sally-
Anne task' (first order theory of mind test) with performance on a simplified version of the 
task, designed by the author. In order to do this, three matched groups of subjects will be 
employed: individuals with autism, learning-disabled (but non-autistic) individuals and 
normally developing individuals. It is hoped that using cartoon drawings, to tell the stories 
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used in the theory of mind tasks, will aid autistic subjects to focus on only the salient 
features of the story (rather than being distracted by puppets, a marble etc). Also by 
representing the story in pictures it means that the actual location of the salient object (e.g. 
Sally' s marble) will not be visibly off-putting. 
Those participants passing the first order theory of mind will also be given three different 
second order theory of mind tasks. The study also aims to compare performance on the 
traditional ' Ice-Cream Man task' with performance on a simplified cartoon version, 
designed by the author, and the simplified 'Puppy' task used by Tager-Flusberg and 
Sullivan (1994a). 
Finally, the study aims to compare the use of matching subjects according to ei ther 
vocabulary or grammar, on their performance on theory of mind tests. If matching subjects 
on grammatical competence proves more appropriate than on the basis of single word 
vocabulary, then it is predicted that this will remove any significant differences in 
performance, between the groups, on the standard theory of mind tasks as well as on the 
simplified versions of the tasks. 
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1.8 The Hypotheses 
Relating to First Order Theory of Mind Tasks 
1. There will be a significant difference in performance between the autistic, learning 
disabled and normally developing groups (matched on the BPVS) on the 'standard' 
first order theory of mind task (namely Sally-Anne task). 
2. There will be no significant difference in performance between the autistic, learning 
disabled and normally developing groups (matched on the BPVS) on the 'simplified' 
first order theory of mind task (namely Ben's Toy Car task). 
3. Significantly more autistic subjects will pass the simplified fust order theory of mind 
task than the traditional Sally-Anne task. 
Relating to Second Order Theory of Mind Tasks 
4. There will be a significant difference in perfonnance between the autistic, learning 
disabled and normally developing groups (matched on the BPVS) on the ' standard ' 
second order theory of mind task (namely Ice-Cream Man task). 
5a. There will be no significant difference in performance between the autistic, learning 
disabled and normally developing groups (matched on the BPVS) on the 'simplified' 
Puppy task. 
5b. There will be no significant difference in performance between the autistic, learning 
disabled and normally developing groups (matched on the BPVS) on the 'simplified' 
Classroom task. 
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6. Significantly more autistic subjects wil1 pass the simplified Classroom and Puppy tasks 
than the traditional Ice-Cream Man task. 
Relating to Matching Participants on the BPVS or the TROG 
7. Matching subjects on the basis of the TROG will remove any significant differences, in 
performance on a theory of mind task, found between the three participant groups 
matched on the BPVS. 
Relating to Verbal Ability 
8. Verbal ability will be significant in subject's performance on the theory of mind tasks. 
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Chapter 2: METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
To be included in the study all participants had to have a receptive verbal age of at least 4 
years on one of the verbal assessments. Three subject populations participated in this 
research namely autistic, learning disabled and normally developing children and 
adolescents. 
Autistic 
There were 23 participants with autism initially recruited to take part in the study (20 boys 
and three girls), who had all received a formal diagnosis of autism, and were attending 
schools for children with autism in Bristol, Bath and Oxford. These subjects were all given 
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) Long form, (Dunn, Dunn, Wbetton & 
Pintilie, 1982) and the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG; Bishop, 1983 ). The BPVS 
assesses understanding of single words whilst the TROG measures understanding of 
grammar. Five participants were excluded at this stage from the study because they did not 
fulfil the criteria of having a receptive verbal age of at least 4 years. A further two 
participants were later excluded because it was not possible to find matched control 
subjects. The remaining 16 participants ( 14 boys and two girls) ranged in age from 5 years 
6 months to 14 years 5 months. 
Learning Disabled 
There were 28 participants with mild-moderate learning difficulties of mixed aetiology ( 19 
boys and nine girls), who were attending special schools in Bristol or Weston-Super-Mare. 
They ranged in age from 8 years 6 months to 17 years 11 months, and were selected to 
match the autistic subjects on the BPVS and/or the TROG. Twelve participants were 
matched, in a pairwise manner, to subjects with autism on the basis of the BPVS and a 
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further 12 were matched on the TROG. Four learning disabled participants were matched 
with four autistic subjects on both the BPVS and TROG. 
Normally Developing 
There were 31 normally developing participants in the study (I 0 boys and 21 girls), who 
were all attending a mainstream school in Bath. They ranged in age from 4 years 1 month 
to 10 years 7 months. Fifteen of these participants were matched with individuals with 
autism on the basis on the BPVS, 15 were matched on the TROG and one subject was 
matched on both the BPVS and TROG. 
Table 1 shows details of the three participant groups, matched on the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS), in terms of their chronological and receptive verbal age. 
Autism Learning Normally 
disabled developing 
(n = 16) (n = 16) (n = 16) 
CA Mean 11 ~0 12;1 1 6;6 
SD 2~5 2~5 2;3 
Range 5;6- 14;5 8;6- 17; 11 4;1 - 10;7 
Verbal Mean 6~5 6~5 6;5 
age SD 3;0 3 ~0 3;0 (BPVS) 
Range 3;1 - 13Jl 3A- t 3;9 3;3-13;9 
Table 1. Description of the participant groups: Chronological age (CA) and verbal age as 
measured by the BPVS 
Note. Ages shown in years; months. 
Table 2 shows details of the three participant groups, matched on the Test for Reception of 
Grammar (TROG), in terms of their chronological and receptive verbal age. 
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Autism Learning Normally 
disabled developing 
(n = 16) (n = 16) (n = 16) 
CA Mean 11 ;0 12;4 5;9 
so 2;5 2;5 1;0 
Range 5;6- 14;5 8;6- 15;4 4;1-7;11 
Verbal Mean 6;6 6;5 6;6 
age SD 2;5 2;5 2;5 (TROG) 
Range 4;0- 11 ;0 3;9 - 11 ;0 4;0-11 ;0 
Table 2. Description of the participant groups: Chronological age (CA) and verbal age as 
measured by the TROG 
Note. Ages shown in years; months. 
The learning disabled and nonnally developing participants were all matched to the 
subjects with autism, on the basis of receptive verbal age, within 3 months. 
2.2 Materials 
A portable tape recorder was used to record each child' s responses to the theory of mind 
tasks. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS), Long Fonn (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & 
Pintilie, 1982) and the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG; Bishop, 1983) were used to 
assess participant' s verbal receptive skills. The BPVS was chosen because it has been used 
predominantly in past research in this area as a means of matching subjects. In addition the 
TROG was used, since it was hypothesised that this may be a better way to match subjects 
as theory of mind tasks involve understanding sentences. 
Sally-An ne Task: This first order theory of mind task was based on that used by Baron-
Cohen et al. ( 1985), and employed two dolls named Sally and An ne, a basket with a lid 
and a small bag. 
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Ben's Toy Car Task: This is a first order theory of mind task designed by the author, with 
a scenario similar to that in the Sally-Anne task, but using a series of eight cartoon 
drawings with the story written underneath (see Appendix lA for the drawings). 
The Ice-Cream Man Task: This second order theory of mind task was based on that used 
in Baron-Cohen's (1989) study. A three-dimensional display, representing a village, was 
constructed in order to act out the scenario for this task. This consisted of a church, a park, 
John' s house, an ice-cream van and two toy people (John and Mary). 
The Puppy Task: This second order task was modelled on that designed by Sullivan et al. 
(1994). A three dimensional house was constructed from card with a basement and 
appropriate props e.g. a small toy puppy, a telephone and dolls for the main characters in 
the story. 
The Classroom Task: This is a second order theory of mind task designed by the author to be 
similar to the Ice-cream Man task, but involving different characters and locations, and using 
a series of nine cartoon drawings to tell the story (see Appendix lB for the drawings). 
2.3 Design 
The participants in the study were seen on two to four occasions, no more than three weeks 
apart. On the first occasion they were all assessed using the TROG and/or the BPVS, 
which were administered in a counterbalanced order. For some children it was necessary to 
see them twice to administer the verbal tests, due to concentration difficulties. In the next 
session, children were given the two first order theory of mind tests. Children who passed 
either one of the first order theory of mind tasks were then given the three second order 
theory of mind tasks. The order of presentation of the first and second order theory of mind 
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tasks was counterbalanced, within each participant group, to control for any effects of 
practice, fatigue and attention. Trios of matched subjects received the theory of mind tasks 
in same order. 
2.4 Procedure 
2.4.1 Participant Groups 
Autistic Participants 
A letter was sent to the Headteachers of nine schools/units for children with autism in 
Bristol, Bath and Oxford explaining the research and asking whether it would be possible 
to recruit subjects from the school (see Appendix 2A for a copy of the letter). Three of 
these schools had suitably able pupils, and agreed to participate in the research. The 
Headteachers then identified pupils with sufficient verbal ability to participate in the 
research, and letters were sent home to their parents asking for consent (see Appendix 28 
for a copy of the letter). 
Children, for whom consent had been given, were seen individually by the author, in a 
quiet room in their school. In the first session it was explained to the child that he/she 
would be shown some pictures, and the BPVS and/or the TROG was then administered. 
Some children were able to complete both the BPVS and TROG in one session, whilst 
others needed to be seen a second time. Participants with a receptive verbal age of 4 years 
of more, on either the BPVS or TROG, were then given the theory of mind tasks as 
outlined in the design. The sessions in which the theory of mind tasks were administered 
were recorded on tape so that the author did not have to take notes. This also enabled the 
author to check for any bias in testing such as giving prompts etc. Children were seen on 
each occasion for a maximum of 20 minutes. 
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Learning Disabled Participants 
A letter was sent to the Headteachers of five schools for children with learning difficulties 
in Bristol and Weston-Super-Mare (see Appendix 2C), explaining the study, and two 
schools agreed to participate. Letters were sent borne to the parents of about 60 children, 
who had been identified by the teachers as both willing and able to participate in the study, 
to obtain consent (see Appendix 2D). Replies giving consent were received from 37 pupils, 
who were then all seen individually by the author in a quiet room in the school. In the first 
session participants were given both the BPVS and the TROG, and for 28 pupils their 
scores on either one or both of these verbal tests matched that of an autistic subject. As 
with the autistic subjects, these pupils were then seen on another one or two occasions to 
be given the theory of mind tasks. 
Normally Developing Participants 
A mainstream school in Bath, with an autistic unit attached, agreed to participate in the 
study. Letters were sent home to the parents of 162 children explaining the research (see 
Appendix 2E) and consent was obtained for 52 pupils to take part. The same procedure as 
for the learning disabled participants was then followed, and 31 children were found to 
match the autistic participants in terms of their receptive verbal age on the BPVS, TROG 
or both. 
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2.4.2 Theory of Mind Tasks 
The Sally-Anne Task 
The following story was told by the experimenter, whilst the characters were moved 
accordingly: 
This is Sally and this Anne. This is a bag and there is a basket. 
Naming question: 'Which is Sally ... and which is Anne?' 
Sally is playing with her marble, but now she wants to go outside to play. 
So Sally puts her marble in the bag and then goes outside. 
Now Anne takes the marble and she puts it in the basket. 
Sally comes back, and she wants to play with her marble. 
Belief question:' Where will Sally look for her marble?' 
Justification question: 'Why?' (This was only asked if the belief question was 
answered correctly). 
Reality control question: 'Where is Sally 's marble really?' 
Memory control question: 'Where did Sally put her marble, in the beginning?' 
To pass this task a subject must say that Sally will look in the bag for her marble (i.e. 
where she believes it is) or point to that location, and also correctly answer the reality and 
memory control questions. 
Ben's Toy Car Task 
The first picture was shown to the participant and the experimenter pointed out Ben, Ben's 
Mother, the box and the cupboard. The participant was then asked to point to each in turn 
e.g. "Can you show me the box?" The remaining seven pictures were then shown to the 
chi ld one at a time. If the participant could read he/she was encouraged to read the story 
underneath the cartoon pictures, but otherwise the author told the story. At the end of the 
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story the experimenter told the participant that now Ben wants to play with his toy car and 
the following questions were asked: 
Belief question: ' Where will Ben look for his car?' 
Justification question: '~Vhy? ' (This was only asked if the belief question was 
answered correctly). 
Reality control question: ' Where is Ben's car really?' 
Memory control question: 'Where did Ben put his car, before he went outside to 
play?' 
A subject was considered to pass this task if he/she stated that Ben would look in the box 
for his car (or pointed to this location on the picture, in response to the belief question). A 
subject was said to fail the task if he/she either indicated that Ben would look in the 
current location for his car (i.e. in the cupboard) or if they failed to answer either of the 
control questions correctly. 
The Ice-Cream Man Task 
The story below was read out, whilst the characters were moved accordingly: 
This is John and this is Mary. They live in this village. 
Naming question: ' Which is John and which is Mary?' 
Here they are in the park. Along comes the ice-cream man. John would like to buy 
an ice-cream, but he has left his money at home. He is very sad. 'Don' t worry' says 
the ice-cream man, 'you can go home and get your money and buy some ice-cream 
later. I'l l be here in the park all afternoon. ' 'Oh good' says John, 'I'll be back in the 
afternoon to buy an ice-cream.' 
Prompt question ( 1 ): 'Where did the ice-cream man say to John that he would be 
all afternoon?' 
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So John goes home. He lives in this house. Now, the ice-cream man says to Mary ' I 
am going to drive my van to the church to see if I can sell my ice-creams outside 
there'. Then Mary goes home. 
Prompt question (2): ' Where did the ice-cream man say he was going?' 
Prompt question (3): 'Did John hear that?' 
The ice-cream man drives over to the church. On his way he passes John 's house. 
John sees him and says ' Where are you going?' The ice-cream man says 'I'm going 
to sell some ice-cream outside the church', and off he drives to the church. 
Prompt question (4): ' Where did the ice-cream man tell John he was going?' 
Prompt question (5): 'Does Mary know that the ice-cream man has talked to John?' 
So John goes to the church to buy an ice-cream. Now Mary goes to John' s house. 
She knocks on the door and says ' Is John in?' 'No,' says his mother, ' he's gone out 
to buy an ice-cream.' 
Belief question:' Where does Mary think John has gone to buy an ice-cream?' 
Justification question: ' Why?' (This was only asked if the belief question was 
answered correctly). 
Reality control question: 'Where did John really go to buy his ice-cream?' 
Memory control question:' Where was the ice-cream man in the beginning? ' 
If any of the prompt questions were answered incorrectly by a participant, tben the correct 
answer was provided. For example if in response to prompt question (3) the participant 
stated that John did hear, tben the experimenter explained that 'No, Jobn could not bave 
heard because he is in his house.' Tn order to pass this task the subject had to point to or 
say the park in response to the belief question, and also correctly answer the reality and 
memory control questions. 
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The Puppy Task 
The experimenter read out the fo llowing story, and the events were enacted using the 
props: 
Tonight it's Peter's birthday and Mum is surprising him with a puppy. She has 
hidden the puppy in the basement. Peter says, 'Mum, I reaJly hope you get me a 
puppy for my birthday.' Remember, Mum wants to surprise Peter with a puppy. So 
instead of tel ling Peter she got him a puppy Mum says, 'Sorry Peter, I did not get 
you a puppy for your birthday. I got you a really great toy instead.' 
Prompt question (1): 'Did Mum really get Peter a toy for his birthday?' 
Prompt question (2): 'Did Mum tell Peter she got him a toy for his birthday?' 
Prompt question (3): ' Why did Mum te/1 Peter that she got him a toy for his 
birthday?' 
Now Peter say to Mum, 'I'm going outside to play.' On his way outside, Peter goes 
down to the basement to fetch his roJJer skates. In the basement, Peter finds the 
birthday puppy! Peter says to himself, ' Wow, Mum didn' t get me a toy, she really 
got me a puppy for my birthday.' Mum did NOT see Peter go down to the basement 
and find the birthday puppy. 
Prompt question ( 4): 'Does Peter know that his Mum got him a puppy for his 
birthday?' 
Prompt question (5): 'Does Mum know that Peter saw the birthday puppy in the 
basement?' 
Now the telephone rings, ding-a-ling! Peter' s grandmother calls to find out what 
time the birthday party is. Grandma asks Mum on the phone, 'Does Peter know 
what you got him for his birthday?' 
Second-order ignorance question: ' What does Mum say to Grandma?' 
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Now remember, Mum does not know that Peter saw what she got him for his 
birthday. Then, Grandma says to Mum, 'What does Peter think you got him for his 
birthday?' 
Second-order false belief question: ' What does Mum say to Grandma?' 
Justification question: ' Why does Mum say that?' (This was only asked if the 
second-order false belief question was answered correctly). 
If any of the prompt questions were answered incorrectly then the experimenter provided 
the correct answer. To pass this task the participate had to answer correctly the second 
order ignorance question, stating that Mum would say 'No', Peter doesn' t know what he is 
getting for his birthday. In addition participants had to answer the second-order false belief 
question correctly, by saying that Mum would say ' a toy.' 
The Classroom Task 
The first picture was shown to the participant and the experimenter pointed out Tom, Jane, 
the teacher, the drawers and the store cupboard. The participant was then asked to point to 
each in turn e.g. "Can you show me the teacher?" The remaining eight pictures were then 
shown to the child one at a time. The story shown below, which accompanies the pictures, 
was read out and various questions were asked: 
Tom and Jane are in the classroom. Tom has finished his painting. 
Tom puts his painting in his drawer. 
Tom goes outside to play. 
Prompt question (1 ): ' Where did Tom put his painting?' 
' Oh dear' says the teacher, 'Tom' s painting will not be dry. ' 
So the teacher goes to Tom's drawer and takes out Tom's painting. 
The teacher puts Torn ' s painting in the store cupboard to dry. 
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Then Jane goes outside to play. 
Prompt question (2): ' Where did the teacher put Tom's painting?' 
Prompt question (3): 'Did Tom see the teacher put his painting there? ' 
Torn and Jane are in the playground. Jane says to Tom ' Your painting was not dry, 
so the teacher put it in the store cupboard. ' 
Prompt question (4): ' Where did Jane tell Tom the teacher had put his painting?' 
Prompt question (5): 'Did the teacher hear Jane talking to Tom?' 
Tom and Jane are back in the classroom. The teacher says, 'It is time to go home. 
Tom do not forget to take your painting'. 
Belief question: ' Where does the teacher think Tom wi/1/ookfor his painting?' 
Justification question: ' Why?' (Thjs was only asked if the belief question was 
answered correctly). 
Reality control question: ' Where will Tom really look for his painting' 
Memory control question: ' Where did Tom put his painting at the beginning of the 
story?' 
If any of the prompt questions were incorrectly answered then the experimenter provided 
the correct answer. To pass thjs task subjects had to answer the belief question correctly, 
by saying that the teacher thinks Tom will look for his painting in the drawer or by 
pointing to the drawer. In addition subjects had to answer correctly the reality and memory 
control questions. 
2.4.3 Response Coding of the Justification Questions 
Participants who correctly answered the belief question, in any of second order theory of 
mind tasks, were asked to justify their responses. The responses given to the justification 
questions were then coded into categories, based on those used by Pemer and Wimmer 
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( 1985) and Sullivan et al. (1994). In the Ice-Cream Man task the justification question 
'why?' (i.e. does Mary think John has gone to the park to buy an ice-cream) was asked. ln 
the Puppy task the following justification question was asked: ' why does Mum say that?' 
(i.e. say to Grandma that Peter thinks he is getting a toy for his birthday). In the classroom 
task the justification question ' why?' (i.e. does the teacher think Tom will look in his 
drawer for his painting) was asked. 
The categories were divided into two groups: 
1. Appropriate justifications: These all demonstrated that the participant was aware of 
what one character does or does not know about the other character' s knowledge of 
events or relevant information. 
a) Explicit second order reasoning: the participant refers explicitly to both characters' 
beliefs. For example in the Ice-Cream Man task: "Mary doesn' t know that John 
knows where the ice-cream man is" e.g. Puppy task: "Mum does not know that 
Peter knows what he is getting for his birthday" e.g. Classroom task: "The teacher 
doesn' t know that he knows". 
b) Implicit second order reasoning: the participant implicitly refers to both 
characters' beliefs. For example in the lee-Cream Man task: "She didn' t hear the 
ice-cream man tell John he was going to the church" e.g. Puppy task: "His mum 
doesn' t know that he's found the puppy" e.g. Classroom task: "The teacher didn' t 
tell him she'd moved the painting and she doesn' t think Jane told him". 
c) Communicated information: information about the salient object (namely the Ice-
cream van or the puppy/toy) or its location is communicated to the secondary 
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character (namely John or Peter). For example in the Ice-Cream Man task: "The 
ice-cream man told John he would stay in the park" e.g. Puppy task: "Mum told 
Peter that he was getting a toy". 
d) Location: The original location of the salient object (i.e. the ice-cream van or the 
painting) is mentioned. For example in the Ice-Cream Man task: "Because the ice-
cream man was in the park" e.g. Classroom task: "Because first his painting was in 
there and then he went out to play." 
e) Deception: In the Puppy task reference is made to Mum trying to deceive Peter 
about his birthday present e.g. "Because Mum wanted to surprise Peter". 
2. Inappropriate justificatiollS: The other categories were designated inappropriate 
because they did not indicate that the participant understood which information was 
relevant. 
a) First-order reasoning: Irrelevant knowledge of the main character (i.e. Mary, Mum 
or the teacher) is mentioned. For example in the lee-Cream Man task: "Mary knows 
the ice-cream van is at the church" e.g. Puppy task: "Mum knows Peter isn' t getting 
a toy" e.g. Classroom task: "The teacher knows his painting is in the cupboard". 
b) Story facts! nonsense: Facts that may be correct or incorrect are mentioned or 
nonsensical, irrelevant or novel information is mentioned. For example in the Ice-
Cream Man task: "John went home to get his money" e.g. Puppy task: "For his 
birthday" e.g. Classroom task: "Because it wasn' t dry". 
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Chapter 3: RESULTS 
3.1 Statistical Analyses 
Pearson chi-square test was predominantly used in the analysis of the data, since the data is 
categorical and the observations are independent. Chi-square, however, may not be a valid 
statistical test when the expected frequencies are too small. It is generally accepted that, in 
contingency tables, all cells must have an expected frequency of at least one and no more 
than 20 per cent of cells should have an expected frequency of less than five in order to use 
chi-square. Where these assumptions are violated, in a contingency table containing two 
rows and two columns, then Fisher's Exact probability test can be used reliably. It should 
be noted, however, that Camilli and Hopkins ( 1978) demonstrated that even with small 
expected frequencies the chi-square test produces few Type I errors (i.e. incorrectly 
rejecting the null hypothesis), as long as the total sample size is greater than seven. 
3.2 Summary of Results for Theory of Mind Tasks 
Table 3 shows the numbers of participants in each group (matched on the BPVS), who 
passed and failed each of the theory of mind tests. 
Theory of mind Autistic Learning disabled Normally 
tasks developing 
Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail 
First order tasks 
Sally-Anne 6 10 10 6 13 3 
Ben's toy car 10 6 11 5 14 2 
Second order tasks 
Ice-Cream Man I 15 2 14 8 8 
Puppy 3 13 3 13 9 7 
Classroom 3 13 4 12 10 6 
Table 3. Participant's performance (matched on the BPVS) on the theory of mind tasks. 
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The results in Tables 3 are represented graphically below in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Percentage pass rates on the theory of mind tasks of participant groups matched 
on the BPVS. 
Table 4 shows the numbers of participants in each group (matched on the TROG), who 
passed and failed each of the theory of mind tests. 
Theory of mind Autistic Learning disabled Normally 
tasks developin2 
Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail 
First order tasks 
Sally-An ne 6 10 6 10 14 2 
Ben 's toy car 10 6 7 9 15 l 
Second order tasks 
lee-Cream Man 1 15 4 12 6 10 
Puppy 3 13 3 13 7 9 
Classroom 3 13 4 12 12 4 
Table 4. Participant's performance (matched on the TROG) on the theory of mind tasks. 
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The results in Tables 4 are represented graphically below in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Percentage pass rates on the theory of mind tasks of participant groups matched 
on theTROG 
As can been seen in the graphs, there is a definite trend (in each participant group) for 
more subjects to pass the ' simplified' Ben task than the standard Sally-Anne task. This 
improvement in performance is greatest for the autist ic subjects. Similarly there is a 
general trend for more participants to pass the ' simplified' Puppy and Classroom tasks 
than the standard Ice-Cream task. 
3.3 First Order Theory of Mind Tasks 
Sally-An ne Task 
All the participants correctly answered the naming question. All the participants, except 
for one learning disabled child, correctly answered the reality control question, saying that 
the ball was really in the basket at the end of the scenario. In addition, all but one autistic 
and one learning disabled child passed the memory control question, correctly stating that 
Sally had put her marble in the bag at the beginning of the story. 
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For the three participant groups matched on the BPVS, 38 per cent of the autistic, 63 per 
cent of the learning disabled and 81 per cent of the normaJiy developing subjects passed 
the Sally-Anne task. For those matched on the TROG, 38 per cent of the autistic and 
learning disabled subjects and 88 per cent of the normally developing subjects passed this 
task (see Figures 1 and 2). Three participants who fai led this task did so due to incorrectly 
answering one ofthe control questions (as mentioned above). The majority of subjects who 
failed this task, however, did so because of failing the belief question. All the participants 
who fai led the belief question did not take account of Sally's false belief, and stated that 
she would look for her marble in the basket where it really was. 
Hypothesis 1: A Pearson cbi-square analysis showed that there was a significant difference 
between the three participant groups (i.e. autistic, learning disabled and normally 
developing), matched on the BPVS, in terms of their performance on the Sally-Anne task 
(X.2 = 6.45, d.f. = 2, p = .04), thereby confirming Hypothesis 1. There was, however, no 
significant difference between the performance of the autistic subjects and those with a 
learning disability on the Sally-Anne task (X.2 = 2.0, d.f. = 1, p = .16). 
Ben's Toy Car Task 
For the autistic, learning disabled and normally developing groups (matched on the BPVS) 
63 per cent, 69 per cent and 88 per cent of subjects passed the Ben task respectively. 
Whilst for those participants matched on the TROG, 63 per cent of the autistics, 44 per 
cent of the learning disabled and 94 per cent of the nonnally developing subjects passed 
this task (see Figures I and 2). All the participants correctly answered the reality control 
question. One autistic participant failed this task by incorrectly answering the memory 
control question, whilst the rest all failed because of answering the belief question wrongly 
by stating that Ben would look in the cupboard for his toy car. 
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Hypothesis 2: A Pearson chi-square analysis showed that there was no significant 
difference between the autistic, learning disabled and normally developing subjects 
(matched on the BPVS) in their performance on the Ben task (X.2 = 2.74, d.f. = 2, p = .25), 
thereby confirming Hypothesis 2. It should be noted that for this Pearson chi-square 
analysis the assumptions have been violated, since three cells (50 per cent) have an 
expected count of 4.33 (i.e. less than five). 
A Fisher's Exact test was therefore calculated for the autistic and normally developing 
groups only, and it showed that there was no significant difference between these two 
participant groups on the Ben task (p = .11). The number of learning disabled subjects who 
passed this task fell between the number of autistic and number of normally developing 
subjects who passed. It can therefore be assumed that there will also be no significant 
difference in performance between the autistic and learning disabled subjects, and between 
the learning disabled and normally developing subjects. These results help to substantiate 
the finding of the chi-square analysis, that there was no significant difference between the 
three participant groups on the Ben task. 
Comparison Between the First Order Tasks 
Hypothesis 3: Thirty-eight per cent of the autistic participants passed the Sally-Anne task, 
whilst 63 per cent passed Ben's toy car task. This difference did not reach significance on 
a chi-square test (X2 = 2.0, d. f.= 1, p = .16), thereby not proving Hypothesis 3 to be true. 
3.4 Second Order Theory of Mind Tests 
All the participants in the study were given the frrst order theory of mind tests, however if 
a subject failed both of these tests it was assumed that they would not pass the more 
complex second order tests, which were therefore not administered. 
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Ice-Cream Man Task 
All the participants, except for one learning disabled subject, correctly answered the reality 
and memory control questions. Four learning disabled and seven normally developing 
subjects incorrectly answered at least one of the prompt questions. In these cases the 
experimenter provided the correct answers to the prompt questions, and these subjects 
were not considered to fail the task provided they correctly answered the control and belief 
questions. All the participants, who failed the belief question, said that Mary would think 
John had gone to the church to buy his ice-cream (i.e. where John had really gone) and did 
not take account ofMary' s false belief. 
For the autistic, learning disabled and nonnally developing groups (matched on the BPVS) 
6 per cent, 13 per cent and 50 per cent of subjects passed this task respectively. Whilst for 
those subjects matched on the TROG, 6 per cent of the autistic participants, 25 per cent of 
the learning disabled and 38 per cent of the non learning disabled participants passed the 
lee-Cream Man task (as shown in Figures 1 and 2). 
Hypothesis 4: A Pearson chi-square analysis showed that there was a highly significant 
difference between the three participant groups (matched on the BPVS) in terms of their 
performance on the Ice-Cream Man task (X2 = 10.14, d.f. = 2, p = .006), thereby 
confirming Hypothesis 4. It should be noted that for tills Pearson chi-square analysis the 
assumptions have been violated, since three cells (50 per cent) has an expected count of 
less than five. As mentioned earlier, however, the chances of incorrectly rejecting the null 
hypothesis in this case are small. In addition, from observation of the graph there is clearly 
a large difference in performance between the normally developing subjects and the other 
two participant groups. Fisher' s Exact test showed that there was no significant difference 
between the autistic and learning disabled subjects' performance on this task (p = .SO). 
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Puppy Task 
There were six autistic, six learning disabled and three normally developing participants 
who answered one or two of the prompt questions incorrectly. As with the Ice-Cream Man 
task, provided these subjects correctly answered the ignorance and false belief questions 
they were not considered to fail this task. All the participants who failed this task did so 
because of incorrectly answering the second order false belief question. The vast majority 
of those that fail ed said, that Mum would say to Grandma, that Peter thought he was 
getting a puppy/dog for his birthday (i .e. they did not take account of the fact that Mwn 
believes that Peter thinks he is getting a toy). 
On the Puppy task, 19 per cent of both the autistic and the learning disabled participants 
and 56 per cent of the normally developing participants (matched on the BPVS) passed. 
For the groups matched on the TROG, 19 per cent of the autistic and leamjng disabled and 
44 per cent of the normally developing participants passed this task (as shown in Figures I 
and 2). 
Hypothesis 5a: A Pearson chi-square analysis showed that there was a significant 
difference between the three participant groups (matched on the BPVS) in their 
performance on this task (X2 = 6.98, d.f. = 2, p = .03), thereby not confirming Hypothesis 
5a. There was, however, no significant difference between the performance of the autistic 
and learning disabled participants on this task (Fisher's exact test, p = .5). 
Classroom Task 
Apart from three normally developing children, who fai led the reality control question, all 
the participants correctly answered the memory and reality control questions. One autistic, 
one learning disabled and two normally developing participants failed one of the prompt 
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questions. These participants' answers to the prompt questions were corrected, and they 
were not considered to fail the task provided they correctly answered the belief and control 
questions. All the participants, who failed the belief question, incorrectly answered that the 
teacher would think that Tom would look in the cupboard for his painting. Whilst both the 
teacher and Tom know his painting is in the cupboard, the teacher does not know that Tom 
knows where his painting is. 
For those participants matched on the BPVS, 19 per cent of the autistic, 25 per cent of the 
learning disabled and 63 per cent of the normally developing subjects passed this task. For 
the autistic, learning disabled and normally developing participants (matched on the 
TROG) 19 per cent, 25 per cent and 75 per cent of subjects passed respectively (as shown 
in Figures I and 2). 
Hypothesis 5b: A Pearson chi-square analysis showed that there was a significant 
difference in performance on this task, between the three participant groups matched on 
the BPVS (X2 = 7.83, d.f. = 2, p = .02), thereby not confirming Hypothesis 5b. There was, 
however, no significant difference between the performance of the autistic and learning 
disabled participants on this task (Fisher's exact test, p = .5). 
Comparison Between the Second Order Tasks 
Hypothesis 6: For the autistic participants, 6 per cent passed the Ice-Cream Man task, 19 
per cent passed the Puppy task and 19 per cent passed the Classroom task. The difference 
between performance on the Puppy or Classroom task as compared with performance on 
the Ice-Cream Man task did not reach significance, on Fisher' s exact test (p = .5). 
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Post-hoc analysis: From observation of the results there appears to be a large difference in 
the performance of the normally developing participants (matched on the TROG) on the 
Ice-Cream Man and Classroom tasks. A chi-square analysis showed that significantly more 
normally developing participants passed the Classroom task than the Ice-Cream Man task 
(:X.2 = 4.57, d.f. = 1, p = .03). 
3.5 Matching Participants on the Basis of the BPVS or TROG 
The majority of participants in the study were given two tests of verbal age, namely the 
BPVS and the TROG. In addition a large number of children were screened to see whether 
they fulfilled the criteria to be included in the study, and whether their score on one of the 
verbal tests matched that of an autistic participant. Figure 3 below shows the verbal ages 
on the BPVS and TROG of all those children who were given both verbal tests. 
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Figure 3. Verbal age as assessed on the BPVS against verbal age as assessed on the TROG 
for all children. 
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As can be seen in the graph there is a linear relationship between verbal age on the TROG 
and on the BPVS. Some children, however, scored much higher on the BPVS than the 
TROG whilst for others the reverse was true. Pearson's correlation was calculated for all 
the individuals who were administered both the BPVS and TROG, and it was found that 
there was a significant correlation between scores on the two verbal tests (r = 0.734, p < 
.01, one-tailed). 
Hypotltesis 7: Since a significant difference in performance on the Sally-Anne task was 
found between the three participant groups, matched on the BPVS, the analysis was 
repeated for those participants matched on the TROG. A Pearson chi-square analysis 
showed that there was also a significant difference between the three participant groups, 
matched on the TROG, in terms of their performance on the Sally-Anne task (X2 = 10.74, 
d. f.= 2, p = .005). 
There was no significant difference in performance between the three participant groups, 
matched on the BPVS, on the Ben task. In addition, when matched on the TROG, there 
was no significant difference in performance between the autistic and normally developing 
subjects on this task, Fishers exact test (p = .08). 
As a significant difference in performance on the Ice-Cream Man task was found between 
the three participant groups, matched on the BPVS, the analysis was repeated for those 
subjects matched on the TROG. A Pearson chi-square analysis showed that there was no 
significant difference between the three participant groups, matched on the TROG, in their 
performance on the Ice-Cream Man task (X 2 = 4.48, d.f. = 2, p = .11). It should be noted 
that for this Pearson chi-square analysis the assumptions have been violated, since three 
cells (50 per cent) have an expected count of less than five. Observation of Figure 2, 
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however, shows little difference between the participant groups on this task, especially 
when compared with the results shown in Figure I. 
Similarly, as a significant difference in performance on the Puppy task was found between 
the three participant groups, matched on the BPVS, the analysis was repeated for those 
subjects matched on the TROG. A Pearson chi-square analysis again showed that there was 
no significant difference between the three participant groups, matched on the TROG, in 
their performance on this task (X2 = 3.38, d.f. = 2, p = .19). 1t should be noted that for this 
Pearson chi-square analysis the assumptions have been violated, since three cells (50 per 
cent) has an expected count of less than five. Observation of Figure 2, however, shows 
little difference between the participant groups on this task, especially when compared 
with the results in Figure 1. 
Lastly, as a significant difference in performance on the Classroom task was found 
between the three participant groups, matched on the BPVS, the analysis was repeated for 
those subjects matched on the TROG. A Pearson chi-square analysis showed that there was 
also a significant difference between the three participant groups, matched on the TROG, 
in their performance on this task (X2 = 12.72, d.f. = 2, p = .002). 
3.6 Verbal Ability and Theory of Mind Performance 
Table 5 below shows the mean age of subjects, for each participant group matched on the 
BPVS, who passed and failed each theory of mind task. The results for participants 
matched on the TROG show a very similar pattern (see Appendix 3). 
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Mean verbal age (on BPVS) 
Tbeory of Mind Autism Leaming disabled Normally 
Tasks deve/opinl! 
'passers' 'failers' 'passers' 'failers' 'passers' 'failers' 
Sally-Anne 7; 11 5;7 7;4 5;0 7;0 3;11 
Ben 7;2 5;3 7;5 4;4 6;9 4;3 
Ice-Cream Man 13; 11 6;0 9;7 6;0 7;7 5;4 
Puppy 10;5 5;7 10;9 5;5 8;3 4;2 
Classroom 10;5 5;7 9;9 5;4 7; 10 4;2 
Table 5. Mean age (years; months) of 'passers' and 'failers' in each participant group on 
each theory of mind task. 
The table shows that on all the theory of mind tasks, for each participant group, the mean 
verbal age on the BPVS is higher for those subjects that passed as compared with those 
that failed. In addition, it can be seen that the mean verbal age of autistic subjects passing 
the Ben task is lower than for those passing the Sally-Anne task. Also for the autistic 
subjects, the mean verbal age of passing the Ice-Cream Man task is higher than that of the 
Puppy or Classroom tasks. 
Hypothesis 8: Considering the three participant groups together (matched on the BPVS), 
independent samples t-tests showed that there was a significant difference in verbal age 
between those passing and those failing the Sally-Anne task (t = -2.67, d.f. = 46, p = .01, 
two-tailed); the Ben task (t = -2.58, d.f. = 46, p = .01, two-tailed); the Ice-Cream Man 
task (t = -2.90, d.f. = 46, p = .01, two-tailed); the Puppy task (t = -5.47, d.f. = 46, p < .01, 
two-tailed) and the Classroom task (t = -4.91, d.f. = 46, p < .01, two-tailed). Verbal age 
is, therefore, a significant factor in subject's performance on the theory of mind tasks, 
thereby confirming Hypothesis 8. 
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3. 7 Contingency Between Tasks 
Since the trends, in terms of contingency between various theory of mind tasks, were 
found to be very similar for the participants matched on the BPVS and those matched on 
the TROG it was decided to present the combined data for all participants. 
Table 6 shows the number of subjects passing both, neither or either one of the first order 
theory of mind tasks. 
Sally-Anne and Ben Autistic Learning Normally Total 
tasks (Passes) disabled developin2 
Both 5 13 27 45 
Neither 5 13 3 21 
Sally-Anne only I 0 0 1 
Ben only 5 2 I 8 
Table 6. Contingency table for the Sally-Anne and Ben tasks. 
Table 6 provides further evidence for the trend that the Ben task was easier for participants 
(especially with autism) than the Sally-Anne task. Since eight children passed the Ben task, 
but failed the Sally-Anne task, whilst only one child showed the opposite response pattern. 
Table 7 shows the number of subjects passing both, neither or either one of the Classroom 
and Ice-Cream Man second order tasks. 
Ice-Cream Man and Autistic Learning Normally Total 
Classroom tasks disabled developing 
(Passes) 
Both I 3 12 16 
Neither 13 20 7 .JO 
Ice-Cream Man only 0 2 2 
" 
Classroom only 2 3 10 15 
Table 7. Contingency table for the Ice-Cream Man and Classroom tasks. 
60 
Similarly table 7 provides further evidence that the Classroom task was easier for subjects 
than the Ice-Cream Man task, since 15 children passed the Classroom task but failed the 
Ice-Cream Man task, whilst only four children showed the opposite response pattern. 
Table 8 shows the number of subjects passing both, neither or either one of the Classroom 
and Puppy second order tasks. 
Puppy and Autistic Learning Normally Total 
Classroom tasks disabled developing 
(Passes) 
Both 3 4 15 21 
Neither 13 22 8 -13 
Puppy only 0 0 I I 
Classroom only 0 2 7 9 
Table 8. Contingency table for the Puppy and Classroom tasks. 
Finally, it would appear from the above table that the Classroom task was also easier for 
participants than the Puppy task, since nine children passed the Classroom task but failed 
the Puppy task, whilst only one child showed the opposite response pattern. 
There appeared to be little difference in difficulty between the Puppy and lee-Cream Man 
task, since overall eight participants passed the Puppy task only (and failed the lee-Cream 
Man) whilst five participants showed the opposite response pattern. 
3.8 Justification Question Responses 
As outlined in the method, subjects were asked to justifY their correct answers to the belief 
questions in the second order theory of mind tasks and these justifications were then 
coded. Appendix 4A shows all the justification question responses and coding, for each 
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theory of mind task. A table showing the frequency of each type of justification is shown 
in Appendix 4B. As can be seen in the table in Appendix 4B, not one participant gave an 
explicit second order justification, and only 25 per cent of responses given were 
categorised as implicit second order. These results are summarised in Table 9 below. 
Theory of mind tasks and Autistic Learning Normally 
justifications disabled developin2 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Ice-Cream Man task 
Total appropriate I 100 4 80 6 43 
Total inappropriate 0 0 I 20 8 57 
Puppy task 
Total appropriate 3 100 2 67 16 89 
Total inappropriate 0 0 I 33 2 11 
Classroom task 
Total appropriate 2 67 5 83 13 58 
Total inappropriate I 33 I 17 9 42 
Table 9. Summary ofjustification question responses for each second order task. 
The number of autistic subjects passing the second order theory of mind tasks is small, 
however, they appear to be no worse at appropriately justifying their answers than the 
learning disabled or normally developing participants. 
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Chapter 4: DISCUSSION 
In the following discussion, the aims of the study will be reviewed briefly and then the 
results will be discussed in relation to the hypotheses and relevant literature. lt should be 
noted that the results and verbal ages quoted will refer to the BPVS (unless otherwise 
stated), since this is the verbal test that has most commonly been used in past research, and 
will therefore allow comparisons to be made with previous findings. This chapter will 
conclude with a critique of the study and consideration of the implications for future 
research, theory and practice. 
4.1 Review of the Aims 
The main aim of the study was to provide evidence that individuals with autism do have a 
theory of mind, but that the standard tests used in a number of previous studies need to be 
simplified for this population in order for their ability to show. 
A further aim was to show that language ability is significant in terms of theory of mind 
task performance, and that matching participants in terms of their understanding of 
grammar (mther than single word understanding) would be more appropriate, due to the 
nature of the theory of mind tasks. 
4.2 The First Order Theory of Mind Tasks 
Sally-An ne Task 
As predicted, there was a significant difference between the three participant groups (i.e. 
the autistic, learning disabled and normally developing subjects), on the standard first 
order theory of mind task, called the Sally-An ne task. This replicates a large body of past 
research, where failure on this and similar first order theory of mind tasks has been taken 
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to show that individuals with autism have a deficit in theory of mind (as discussed in 
Section 1.3 of the introduction). 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), in their original study, found that 20 per cent of the autistic 
participants, 86 per cent of the learning disabled and 85 per cent of the nonnally 
developing participants passed the Sally-Anne task. In comparison, in this study 38 per 
cent of the autistic, 63 per cent of the learning disabled and 81 per cent of the nonnally 
developing participants passed the Sally-Anne task. The verbal ages of the autistic children 
in the current study were, however, slightly higher in comparison to those of the children 
included in Baron-Cohen et al. 's ( 1985) study. The lower age limit, in both Baron-Cohen 
et al.'s and the current study were very similar (2 years 8 months and 3 years 1 month 
respectively) however the upper age limits differed (7 years 5 inonths and 13 years 11 
months respectively). Selecting, therefore, only the autistic children in the current study 
with a verbal age less than 7 years 5 months it was possible to make a more precise 
comparison. It was then found that 30 per cent of the autistic children passed the Sally-
Anne task, which is similar to Baron-Cohen et al. 's finding. The number of nonnally 
developing subjects who passed the Sally-Anne task in the current study is also 
comparable to that found in previous research. 
Regarding the learning disabled subjects, it is of interest to note that a higher percentage 
passed the Sally-Anne task in Baron-Cohen et al. 's study than in the current study (86 per 
cent and 63 percent respectively). This is even more significant when one considers that in 
Baron-Cohen et al. 's study the learning disabled subjects all had verbal ages less than 4 
years, whilst in the current study all the participants had verbal ages greater than 4 years. 
This discrepancy in findings cannot be attributed to degree of learning disability, since the 
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groups in both studies were very similar in terms of chronological age, so it is likely that 
the participants in Baron-Cohen et al.'s (1985) study were more learning disabled. 
Baron-Cohen et al., and a number of other studies with similar results, employed learning 
disabled participants solely with Down Syndrome, whilst in the current study subjects' 
learning disabilities were of mixed aetiology. It may be, therefore, that individuals with 
Down Syndrome do not have the same difficulty with theory of mind as other learning 
disabled children. Individuals with Down syndrome have a unique profile, in that typically 
their cognitive abilities are more developed than their verbal abilities, and they show 
relative strengths in certain aspects of their attentional, social and emotional abilities, as 
compared with autistic individuals (Beeghly, Weiss-Perry & Cicchetti, 1990; Dodd, 1975; 
Kasari, Mundy, Yirmiya & Sigman, 1990; Mundy, Sigman, Kasari & Yirmiya, 1988; Rohr 
& Burr, 1978). It may be that these strengths have contributed to the better performance of 
Down syndrome subjects in past research. In comparison, several studies which have 
employed learning disabled individuals without Down syndrome, have found this 
participant group to be significantly worse than mental age matched normally developing 
children, on both first and second order theory of mind tasks (e.g. Benson et al., 1993; 
Sodian & Frith, 1992.) 
Ben's Toy Car Task 
As predicted, contrary to prior research, there was no significant difference in performance 
between the autistic, learning disabled and normally developing participants (matched on 
the BPVS) on the simplified first order theory of mind task, known as the Ben task. Other 
studies have found no significant difference in performance, between autistic and learning 
disabled control subjects, on the standard first order theory of mind task (Oswald & 
Ollendick, 1989; Tager-Fiusberg & Sullivan, 1994b; Yirmiya & Shulman, 1996.) Prior et 
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al. (1990) also found no significant difference between autistic and learning disabled 
participants on the Sally-Anne task, when they used real people to act out the scenario 
instead of dolls. A thorough literature review has, however, not revealed any other study 
that has found autistic participants to perform similarly to normally developing 
participants, on a first order theory of mind task. 
This finding suggests that the modifications made, to the standard Sally-Anne task, had an 
effect on the performance of the autistic subjects. It is important to note, however, the 
difficulty in proving a null hypothesis. The changes were designed to focus the attention of 
the autistic children more on the story. They also prevented the actual location of the 
salient object (in this case Ben's car) from being a distraction, when the belief question 
was asked. From observations made during testing, it did appear that the autistic children 
were better able to concentrate on the Ben task than the Sally-Anne task, since during the 
Sally-Anne task a number of children wanted to play with the marble or open the bag and 
basket. In addition, when the belief question was asked in the Sally-Anne task ('where 
does Sally think her marble is?') a number of children opened up the basket, revealing the 
actual location of the marble. It would seem, from this behaviour, that the actual location 
of the marble was distracting for participants. 
It is not possible to determine which of the modifications made to the Sally-Anne task 
might have aided the performance of autistic participants. The fact that 'simplifYing' the 
standard first order theory of mind task may remove any significant differences in 
performance, between autistic subjects and matched controls, suggests that individuals 
with autism do have a theory of mind, and that previous research findings are the result of 
a task artefact. 
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Comparison Between tbe Two First Order Tasks 
Autistic Participants 
It was predicted that significantly more autistic subjects would pass the Ben task than the 
Sally-Anne task. It should be noted that whilst nearly double the number of autistic 
children passed the Ben task, as compared with the Sally-Anne task, this difference did not 
reach statistical significance. There are, however, a number of factors that indicate that the 
Ben task was easier for autistic children than the Sally-Anne task. Firstly, from the 
contingency results, it was found that five autistic children passed the Ben and failed the 
Sally-Anne task, whilst only one showed the opposite response pattern. Secondly, 
examining the data on verbal age and performance on the theory of mind tasks, it was 
noted that the mean age of autistic children passing the Ben task was 9 months lower than 
that of those participants passing the Sally-Anne task. Finally, it is of note that the least 
verbally able autistic child to pass the Sally-Anne task had a verbal age of nearly 4\t'l years, 
whilst one autistic participant passed the Ben task with a verbal age just over 3 years. 
Non-autistic Participants 
The modifications made to the standard first order task were specifically aimed at 
simplifying it for autistic subjects. There was, however, also a trend with the learning 
disabled and normally developing groups for a few more subjects to pass the Ben task than 
the Sally-Anne task. This difference was very small, which inay partly be attributable to 
the fact that overall these groups were performing near ceiling level on the first order 
theory of mind tasks. 
Wimmer and Pemer (1983) in their original study found, in a group of normally 
developing subjects, that none of 3-4 year olds, 57 per cent of the 4-6 year olds and 86 per 
cent of 6-9 year olds passed the Sally-Anne task. In the current study, since overall the 
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nonnally developing subjects perfonned near ceiling level, it might be that examining the 
younger children will reveal some difference in perfonnance on the Sally-Anne and Ben 
tasks. This was found to be the case, that the trend of more nonnally developing 
participants passing the Ben than the Sally-Anne task, was only apparent in the youngest 
age group, as shown in Table I 0 below. 
Percentage passing (in each age group) 
Theory of Mind 
Task 4-5 years 5-6 years >6 years 
Sally-Anne Task 50 90 100 
Ben Task 67 90 100 
Table 10. Pass rates of different aged nonnally developing children, on the first order 
theory of mind tasks. 
Other studies have shown that even some 3 year olds can pass first order theory of mind 
tasks (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986; Tager-Fiusberg & Sullivan, 1994b). It might be 
the case that the difference in perfonnance on the Sally-Anne and Ben tasks, in the current 
study, would be greater still in a group of3 year olds. 
4.3 The Second Order Theory of Mind Tasks 
Ice-Cream Man Task 
As predicted there was a significant difference in perfonnance between the three 
participant groups in tenns of their perfonnance on the Ice-Cream Man task. In the current 
study, 6 per cent of the autistic, 13 per cent of the learning disabled and 50 per cent of the 
nonnally developing subjects passed this task. Baron-Cohen ( 1989) in his original study, 
selected only those participants who had passed a first order theory of mind task, and 
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found that none of the autistic, 60 per cent of the learning disabled and 90 per cent of the 
normally developing subjects passed the Ice-Cream Man task. 
In the current study, selecting out only those participants that passed one of the first order 
theory of mind tasks (i.e. 11 autistic, 11 learning disabled and 14 normally developing 
subjects), allows a better comparison to be made with Baron-Cohen's (1989) study. It was 
found that this made little difference to the percentage pass rates on the second order task, 
with 9 per cent of the autistics, 18 per cent of the learning disabled and 57 per cent of the 
normally developing then passing the Ice-Cream Man task. 
It is surprising that whilst the autistic group in Baron-Cohen's (1989) study were older and 
verbally more able, in comparison to the current study, none of them passed the second 
order task. It should be noted that in the current study the 9 per cent of autistic subjects to 
pass this task, only represents one participant. There is also an apparent discrepancy in the 
performance of the learning disabled participants, between Baron-Cohen's study and the 
current one (60 per cent and 18 per cent of subjects passed respectively). In Baron-
Cohen's study the learning disabled participants did not differ significantly in their 
performance from the normally developing participants on the Ice-Cream Man task. Whilst 
in this study the learning disabled group and the autistic group did not differ significantly 
in their performance on this task. This finding is more remarkable when one considers 
that, although the learning disabled subjects in each study were of a similar age, in the 
current study they were more verbally able. This difference in results, across the two 
studies, may again be attributable to the fact that in Baron-Cohen's study the learning 
disabled group consisted only of individuals with Down syndrome. 
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In the current study, whilst the autistic subjects' performance was significantly worse than 
the normally developing subjects on the Ice-Cream Man task, there was no significant 
difference in performance between the autistic and learning disabled participants. A 
number of more recent studies have reported similar results, in so far as finding no 
significant difference between learning disabled subjects and those with autism or 
Asperger's syndrome, in their ability to attribute second order beliefs (Bowler, 1992; 
Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington, 1991; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994a). 
Simplified Puppy and Classroom Tasks 
It was predicted that there would be no significant difference between the three participant 
groups (on the BPVS) on either of the simplified second order tasks (i.e. the Puppy and 
Classroom tasks), however, this was not found to be the case. This difference in 
performance could be due to matching the subjects on the basis of the single word 
understanding rather than on comprehension of grammar (see later discussion in Section 
4.4). 
Puppy Task 
Nineteen per cent of both the autistic and learning disabled subjects and 56 per cent of the 
normally developing subjects passed the Puppy task. In comparison, Tager-Fiusberg and 
Sullivan (1994a), who were the first to employ the Puppy task with individuals with 
autism, found that 58 per cent of the autistic and 67 per cent of the learning disabled 
subjects passed this task. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994a) found a much higher 
percentage of both autistic and learning disabled subjects passed the Puppy task than in the 
current study, but this can be attributed to their participants being older and verbally more 
able. In line with the current study they found no significant difference between the autistic 
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and learning disabled participants on this task. They did not include a normally developing 
control group, so it is not possible to make a comparison in this respect. 
Classroom Task 
In the current study, 19 per cent of the autistic, 25 per cent of the learning disabled and 63 
per cent of the normally developing subjects passed the Classroom task. These pass rates 
are similar to those found for the Puppy task in this study, with a slightly higher percentage 
(though not significantly) of learning disabled and normally developing subjects passing 
the Classroom task. There was found to be no significant difference in performance 
between the autistic and learning disabled participants, on the Classroom task. 
Comparison Between tbe Tbree Second Order Tasks 
Autistic Participants 
It was predicted that significantly more autistic subjects would pass the simplified Puppy 
and Classroom tasks than the standard Ice-Cream Man task. It should be noted that whilst 
three times the number of autistic children passed the Puppy and Classroom tasks, as 
compared with the Ice-Cream Man task, the numbers involved were very small and this 
difference did not reach statistical significance. 
There are a few indications that the Classroom and Puppy tasks were slightly easier for 
autistic children than the Ice-Cream Man task. Firstly, from the contingency results it was 
found that two autistic children passed the Classroom and Puppy tasks but failed the Ice-
Cream Man task, whilst none showed the opposite response pattern. Also examining the 
data on verbal age and performance on the theory of mind tasks, it was noted that the 
autistic participant who passed the Ice-Cream Man task was JY2 years older than the mean 
age of autistic children passing the Puppy or Classroom. In addition, it is of note, that the 
71 
one autistic child to pass the Ice-Cream Man task had a verbal age of nearly 14 years, 
whilst the least verbally able participant to pass the Puppy and Classroom tasks had a 
verbal age of just over 8 years. 
Non-autistic Participants 
The modifications made to the standard second order task were specifically aimed at 
simplifYing it for autistic subjects. There was also a trend with the learning disabled and 
normally developing groups for a few more subjects to pass the Puppy and Classroom 
tasks than the Ice-Cream Man task. It was also found that significantly more normally 
developing subjects passed the Classroom than the Ice-Cream Man task when matched on 
the TROG. Considering the contingency data, it is of particular interest that 10 normally 
developing subjects passed the Classroom task, but failed the Ice-Cream Man task, and 
only two showed the opposite response pattern. In addition seven normally developing 
subjects passed the Classroom task but failed the Puppy task and only one showed the 
opposite response pattern. 
Sullivan et al. (1994}, who designed the Puppy task, employed it with normally developing 
4-8 year olds. They found that significantly more subjects were able to pass this simplified 
version of a second order task (which included prompts and fewer characters, episodes and 
scenes) than passed the standard task. In addition, previous studies have found that 
normally developing children were not able to pass second order theory of mind tasks until 
the age of 6-7 years, however, on the Puppy task 40 per cent of the participants under the 
age of five succeeded. Similarly, considering the younger normally developing participants 
in the current study, it was found that 17 per cent of those under the age of five passed Ice-
Cream and Puppy task whilst a striking 50 per cent passed the Classroom task. 
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Justification Question Responses 
This study showed that the autistic subjects were no worse than the other two participant 
groups at appropriately justifYing their answers, to the false belief question, in the second 
order theory of mind tasks. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan ( 1994a) reported similar findings. 
Pemer and Wimmer (1985) and Baron-Cohen {1989) found in their studies that all the 
children who correctly answered the false belief question were able to appropriately justify 
their responses. In contrast, in the current study between 13 and 45 per cent of participants 
across the groups, failed to give appropriate justifications for their correct answers to the 
false belief question, on a theory of mind task. It is important to note that the participants 
with autism did not give the highest percentage of inappropriate justifications. Tager-
Fiusberg and Sullivan (1994a) also found a number of children, who passed their Puppy 
task, gave inappropriate justifications for their responses. 
Consistent with Bowler's (1992) findings, in the current study none of the subjects, in any 
group, explicitly referred to the beliefs of both characters in their justification responses. In 
both Bowler's and the current study, it was found that the majority of justification 
responses were categorised as either 'location' or 'communicated information.' Bowler 
hypothesised that certain features of the scenarios used, in the second order tasks, focus the 
subject's attention on non-mental explanations, and that the justifications given tend to 
centre on the point in the story at which the false belief was set up. For example in the Ice-
Cream Man task a large number of subjects stated that at the beginning of the story the Ice-
Cream Man was in the park, or that he said he would be there all afternoon. Bowler (1992) 
found support for this theory in a further study in which the false belief, that was set up in 
the mind of one of the protagonists about the other one's belief, was caused by an 
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unintentional act. This led subjects to give an increased number of justifications that made 
a reference to the beliefs of one or both of the characters in the story. 
4.4 Verbal Ability and Theory of Mind Task Performance 
Matching on the Basis of the BPVS or the TROG 
It was predicted that matching subjects on the basis of the TROG would remove any 
significant differences, in performance on a theory of mind task, found between the three 
participant groups matched on the BPVS. lt was believed that matching subjects on the 
basis of their understanding of grammar would be more appropriate, considering the nature 
of the theory of mind tasks, than matching them according to single word understanding. It 
was found that when subjects were matched on the TROG, there was no significant 
difference between the three participant groups on either the Ice-Cream Man or Puppy 
tasks. This is a surprising finding considering the huge difference in performance, found in 
past research, between autistic subjects and matched controls on second order theory of 
mind tasks. It needs to be interpreted with caution, however, because of the difficulty in 
proving a null hypothesis. 
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994a, b) appear to be the only other researchers, to date, to 
have matched subjects according to their comprehension of grammar, using a sub-test of 
the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF). Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan 
(1994a) found no significant difference between the autistic and learning disabled groups 
on the Puppy task. In addition, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994b) found that subject's 
performance on the CELF was a better predictor of theory of mind performance than the 
PPVT (an older version of the BPVS, which assesses single word understanding). 
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There was still a significant difference between the three participant groups, on the Sally-
Anne task, when matched on the TROG. This may be due to an inherent problem with the 
task, in terms of the props causing a distraction, and the true location of the salient object 
being overriding, as previously discussed. It could also be the case that matching subjects 
more appropriately on the TROG only has an impact on the second order theory of mind 
tasks, as these require subjects to have a better understanding of language, since they use 
more complex grammar than the Sally-Anne task. 
This explanation is not entirely consistent with the current findings, as there was still a 
significant difference in performance between the three participant groups, on the 
Classroom task, when matched on the TROG. This remaining difference seems 
attributable to the good performance of the normally developing subjects on this task. One 
of the differences between the Classroom task and the other two second order tasks, is that 
the former had the story written out underneath the pictures, whilst in the other tasks the 
story was read out by the experimenter. Participants were encouraged to read the story out 
loud, for the Classroom task, if they were able to do so. lt may be that more of the 
normally developing children, than those in the other two participant groups, were able to 
read and that this disproportionately helped the former in passing the Classroom task. On 
re-examining the data, however, this was not found to be the case in that similar 
proportions of subjects in each group (between 60 and 80 per cent) were able to read out 
loud. 
Verbal Age of 'Passers' and 'Failers' 
As predicted, verbal ability was a significant factor in subject's performance on the theory 
of mind tasks. There was a significant difference in verbal age between those participants 
passing and failing on all the theory of mind tasks. This finding is consistent with a large 
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body of research, which has also found a link between verbal ability and theory of mind 
task performance (as described in Section 1.4 of the introduction.) 
There appears to be substantial support from a number of studies for a developmental 
cognitive explanation of the deficiencies shown by autistic children, in that once a certain 
level of language ability has been acquired, a theory of mind is more likely to also develop. 
A certain level of language ability is, however, not sufficient for success on theory of mind 
tasks. Since a number of children in the current study, with a. verbal age greater than 6 
years, were still unable to pass the theory of mind tasks. Also, Leslie and Frith ( 1988) and 
Perner et al. ( 1989) employed specific language impaired children as controls in their 
studies, and found that such children were significantly better than autistic children 
(matched on the basis of the BPVS) on false belief tasks. It may be the case that matching 
autistic children on the BPVS does not give a true representation of their ability, due to 
their difficulties with grammar and the pragmatics of language. 
4.5 Summary of the Main Significant Findings 
• There was no significant difference in performance between the autistic, learning 
disabled and normally developing children (matched on the BPVS) on the Ben task. 
When matched on the TROG, there was also no significant difference in performance 
between the autistic and normally developing children on the Ben task. These results 
demonstrate that if the theory of mind task is simplified for autistic children, then they 
may perform similarly to age matched control subjects. 
• There was no significant difference in performance between the autistic and learning 
disabled participants (whether matched on the BPVS or on the TROG) on any of the 
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theory of mind tasks. This evidence suggests that any difficulties autistic subjects have 
with theory of mind is attributable to their learning difficulty, rather than to having 
autism per se. This may be as a result of, not only cognitive problems, but also 
concentration and language difficulties. It is of interest to note that individuals with 
Asperger's syndrome who, by definition whilst socially impaired are not cognitively 
impaired and do not have delayed language, have been found to perform equally to 
normally developing children on second order theory of mind tasks (Bowler, 1992; 
Dahlgren, & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Ozonoff, Rogers & Pennington, 1991 ). 
• There was a significant difference between the three participant groups on the Ice-
Cream Man and Puppy tasks when matched on the BPVS. When matched on the 
TROG, however, there was no significant difference between the three groups on these 
second order tasks. 
• The participants with autism were as able to appropriately justify their answers to the 
belief question, on the second order tasks, as subjects in the other two participant 
groups. 
• Verbal age was found to be a significant factor in theory of mind task performance. 
• Considering the normally developing children under 5 years of age, it was shown that 
more of them passed the 'simpler' first and second order tasks than the equivalent 
'standard' tasks. 
77 
4.6 The Critique 
Participants 
There were 16 subjects in each participant group, which is relatively few, and ideally it 
would have been better to have larger sample sizes. Since autism is a fairly rare disorder it 
was not possible to recruit more participants within the scope of this piece of research. In 
addition, if it had been possible to include more autistic subjects in the study it would have 
compromised the ability to match the control groups so closely, especially on two verbal 
tests. 
There were very few autistic subjects who passed the second order theory of mind tasks, 
and so it would have been preferable to include a larger number of higher ability autistic 
subjects. Since only six participants with autism had a verbal age greater than 7 years, 
which is the age at which children normally develop an understanding of second order 
theory of mind. Similarly, it would have been interesting to include a younger group of 
normally developing children (aged 3-4 years), not only to avoid the near ceiling effect 
found on the first order tasks, but also to discover whether this would lead to an increased 
difference in performance on the Ben and Sally-Anne tasks. 
It is worth noting that while all the participants with autism were attending schools 
specifically for children with autism, all had at some stage been given a formal diab'llosis, 
it was not known what criteria were used to make this diagnosis. This is one difficulty 
faced when comparing results across studies, which have employed children with autism, 
since different studies have used different diagnostic and selection criteria. 
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The participants in the study were all recruited via a letter, which was sent home to their 
parents, asking for consent for their child to take part. Whilst it is unlikely to have affected 
the results overall, one needs to be aware that this means of recruitment could potentially 
lead to a biased sample. Since Noli, Zeller, Vannatta, Bukowski and Davies ( 1997) found 
that children who did not return consent forms were systematically different from 
classmates who did participate, although the differences were small. 
Theory of Mind Tasks 
An important point, in relation to the theory of mind tasks, is that this study is the first to 
employ the Ben and Classroom tasks and therefore the reliability and validity of these 
tasks is yet to be tested. In order to do this, it would be necessary either to repeat the tasks 
with the same subjects at a later date, or to give the same participants a number of versions 
of these tasks (i.e. using different characters and locations) at the same point in time. 
Design 
In this study the author was also responsible for collecting all the data and was therefore 
not blind to the study, in so far as knowing which participant group children were in and 
which were the 'simplified' and which the 'standard' tasks. There is, therefore, a potential 
for bias in terms of how the tasks were administrated and evaluated. The sessions in which 
participants were given the theory of mind tasks were all tape-recorded. This allowed the 
author to check for potential bias in administration of the tasks, for example giving hints or 
extra encouragement. Ideally, it would have course been preferable to have an 
experimenter that was blind to the aims of the study. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that one must always be cautious when using multiple statistical 
tests on the same data set. Due to probability, and therefore potentially by chance alone, 
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one in 20 statistical tests may show a significant result. The chi-square analyses conducted 
in this study, however, were all related to a priori hypotheses and also were used across 
differing data sets. 
4. 7 Implications for Future Research, Theory and Practice 
rt will be important to replicate the findings in this study, especially considering the issues 
of reliability and validity that have already been raised. In addition, it would be useful to 
repeat the study employing subjects with a wider range of ability, in order to avoid the near 
floor effect with the autistic participants on the second order tasks, and the near ceiling 
effect for the normally developing children on the first order tasks. 
A number of other hypotheses have been raised, within this study, that further research 
could help to clarifY. For example whether children with Down syndrome perform better 
on theory of mind tasks than other learning disabled children and also whether subjects 
who are able to read the story on the 'simplified' theory of mind tasks are aided in their 
performance. 
This study provides further evidence for the role of verbal ability in theory of mind task 
performance. A study conducted by Leslie and Frith (1988) found that specific language 
impaired children were significantly better than autistic subjects on theory of mind tasks. 
In the light of the current findings, that matching subjects on the TROG removes some of 
the group differences on second order tasks, it would be important to repeat Leslie and 
Frith's (1988) study but matching subjects on the basis ofthe TROG. 
The findings in this study also provide support for the salient object hypothesis, which 
states that people with autism have difficulty disengaging from a salient object (as 
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discussed in Section 1.4 of the introduction.) Hughes and Russell (1993) found that autistic 
subjects failed a test of strategic deception, because of a difficulty with disengaging from 
a focal object, rather than due to an inability to implant a false belief into the mind of the 
competitor. Since the autistic participants found the task equally difficult when the 
competitive element was removed, Hughes and Russell hypothesised that the children and 
adolescents with autism were failing to disengage their attention from an object that is 
both desired by them and the focus of the task. 
The inability to disengage from a salient object seems too simplistic an explanation to 
account for the many and varied features of autism. In addition, this was just one aspect of 
Hughes and Russell's ( 1993) task, which also required the ability to form a plan. The 
ability to plan, control impulses and inhibit a prepotent but irrelevant response are all 
components of executive functions, which have been thought to be impaired in autism (see 
Section 1.6 of the introduction). The explanation that autism is due to a disorder of the 
executive functions would be strongly supported by evidence that early frontal impairment 
results in later autism. The findings, however, are contradictory (Price, Daffner, Stowe & 
Mesulam, 1990; Welsh, Pennington, Ozonoff, Rouse & McCabe, 1991). There is other 
evidence that supports this explanation of autism. Firstly, the commonalities between 
frontal patients and individuals with autism have been well documented (Damasio & 
Maurer, 1978; Fein, Pennington, Markowitz, Braverman & Waterhouse, 1986; Rumsey, 
1985). Secondly, an impairment of executive functions can offer an explanation of other 
central features of autism, besides the triad of impairments, e.g. stereotypies, excessive 
desire for sameness and repetitive interests in very narrow topics (Kanner, 1943; Prior & 
Macmillan, 1973). These other features of autism all involve perseveration in some form, 
which is also linked to frontal lobe damage. Lastly, a large number of studies have shown 
that autistic subjects and those with Asperger's syndrome perform poorly, in comparison to 
81 
matched controls, on standard tests of executive function (as discussed in Section 1.6 of 
the introduction). 
To conclude, the findings of this study suggest individuals with autism can demonstrate 
that they have a theory of mind and, in addition, any deficit in this ability is not specific to 
autism. Past research, which has found that autistic subjects perform worse on theory of 
mind tasks than matched controls, is more likely to have been the result of the type of 
theory of mind test employed and due to inappropriately matching subjects on the basis of 
single word understanding. It will be important in the future, therefore, that research is 
more focused on other theories of autism, and that especially the executive function 
explanation is given greater consideration. Lastly, this piece of research has implications 
for practice, in terms of interventions with individuals with autism focussing less on theory 
of mind. fnstead people need to be more aware of how tasks are presented to individuals 
with autism and the limitations of their verbal understanding, executive functions, poorer 
concentration and distractibility. 
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Ben is playing with his toy car. 
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Ben's mother takes the toy car out of the box. 
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Ton1 and Jane are in the classrootn. Tom has finished his painting. 
• 
• • 
Tom puts his painting in his drawer. 
• • 
Tom goes outside to play. 
• 
• • 
"Oh dear" says the teacl1er, "Tom's painting will not lJe dry." 
• 
• • 
So the teacher goes .to Tom's drawer and tal<es OLlt To1n's painting. 
-• 
The teacher puts Tom's painting in the store CLipboard to dry. 
Then Jane goes 011tside to play. 
Ton1 and Jane are in the playground. Jane says to Ton1 "Your 
painting was not dry, so the teacher put it in the store cttphoard". 
~- -
---
• 
• • 
Tom and. Jane are back in the classrootn. The teacher says, '.'It is 
ti1ne to go hotne. Tom do not forget to take your painting.'' 
Dear (Headteacher) 
Appendix 2A 
Letter to Headteachers of Autistic Schools/Units 
Clinical Teaching Unit 
University of Plymouth 
4/5 Rowe Street 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
I am currently training as a Clinical Psychologist and recently completed a placement with 
the Phoenix Learning Disability Trust. I am writing to you because as part of my training I 
am required to conduct a piece of research, and I have a particular interest in autism. 
For my thesis I want to investigate theory of mind (that is the ability to understand that 
other people may have thoughts, beliefs and desires different one's ovm) in children and 
adolescents with autism. You may be aware that this is an area in which a lot of research 
has already been conducted, and predominantly it has been concluded that children with 
autism lack a theory of mind. 
The main aim of my research is to provide evidence to support the idea that people with 
autism do possess a theory of mind. I will be arguing that the standard theory of mind tests 
used in past research, however, need to be modified to allow this ability to be exhibited. 
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For my research I need between ten and fifteen children/adolescents with autism to 
participate. I intend to assess chjJdren's verbal ability and then give them a number of 
theory of mind tasks. These tasks involve answering some questions about cartoon stories 
or a story told with puppets, which I hope will be enjoyable for the cruld. I would need to 
see each child on a max.imurn of three occasions, for about half an hour each time. 
Whilst I do not plan to actually start collecting data until July 1998, I was hoping that at 
this stage I might be able to arrange a preliminary visit to discuss my research further with 
you. This wouJd provide an opportunity for me to answer any questions or concerns you 
may have, and a llow me to begin to gain an idea of how many pupils I might be able to 
recruit for my research. 
I do hope you wi ll consider whether you wish your school to be involved in my research, 
and I will be contacting you shortly. Thank you in advance for your help. 
Yours sincerely 
Ms Alex Proto 
(Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
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Dear Parent 
Appendix 2B 
Letter to Parents of Children With Autism 
Clinical Teaching Unit 
University of Plymouth 
415 Rowe Street 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
I am currently training as a Clinical Psychologist, and am writing to you because I have a 
particular interest in autism. For my thesis I want to investigate ' theory of mind' in 
children and adolescents with autism. As you may know, having a ' theory of mind' means 
that you realise that other people might have thoughts and beliefs that are different from 
your own. You may be aware that this is an area in which a lot of research has already been 
conducted, and predominantly it has been concluded that children with autism lack a 
theory of mind. 
The main aim of my research is to provide evidence to support the idea that people with 
autism do possess a theory of mind. I will be arguing that the standard theory of mind tests 
used in past research, however, need to be simplified for individuals with autism, to allow 
this ability to show through. 
I am hoping to recruit about 15 children/adolescents with autism for my research. I wi ll 
need to assess each child's verbal ability and then give them a number of theory of mind 
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tasks. These tasks involve answering some questions about cartoon stories or a story told 
with puppets, which I hope will be enjoyable for the child. 
I have discussed my research ideas with (name ofHeadteacher), who is happy for (name of 
school) to be involved. I am hopeful that you will not have any objections to your child 
taking part in my research. If, however, you would prefer that your child is not involved, 
then I would be grateful if you could infonn (name of Headteacher) of your wish. If you 
have any questions regarding my research, then please do not hesitate to contact me at the 
above address. 
Yours sincerely 
Ms Alex Proto 
(Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
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Appendix 2C 
Letter to Head teachers of Schools for Learning Disabled Children 
Dear (Headteacher) 
Clinical Teaching Unit 
University of Plymouth 
4/5 Rowe Street 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
I am currently training as a Clinical Psychologist, at the University of Plymouth. As weiJ 
as completing various work placements in Bristol, for my training I also need to conduct a 
piece of research, which I am doing in the field of autism. Whilst I am conducting the 
majority of my research in schools for children with autism, I am writing to you because I 
also need a comparison group of learning disabled children to participate. 
For my thesis I want to investigate ' theory of mind' in children, that is being able to put 
yourself in another person' s shoes (i.e. understand that other people may have thoughts and 
beliefs that are different from one' s own). 
I am hoping to include a total of 40-60 children with learning difficulties in my study. I am 
approaching a number of schools, however, so if it would only be possible for me to see a 
smaller number of children, then I would still value your co-operation. I would initially 
need to see each child individually for 15 minutes, to administer a verbal test. Some of 
these children I will need to see again in order to complete several ' theory of mind ' tasks. 
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These tasks simply involve the child answering some questions about cartoon stories or a 
story told with puppets. I have already been into a number of autistic schools and one 
mainstream school, to conduct my research, and all the children I have seen to date have 
enjoyed taking part. 
I do hope you will consider whether you wish your school to be involved in my research, 
and I wilJ be contacting you shortly. Thank you in advance for your help. 
Yours sincerely 
Ms Alex Proto 
(Trainee Clirucal Psychologist) 
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Dear Parent 
Appendix 20 
Letter to Parents of Learning Disabled Children 
Clinical Teaching Unit 
University of Plymouth 
415 Rowe Street 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
I am currently training as a Clinical Psychologist, at the University of Plymouth, and am 
conducting some research into autism. Past research has suggested individuals with autism 
do not have a ' theory of mind', which means they have difficulty putting themselves in 
someone else's shoes. 1 will be arguing that the standard ' theory of mind' tests used in past 
research, however, need to be simplified for individuals with autism, to allow this ability to 
show through. 
I have been conducting the main part of my research in a number of autistic schools. I also 
need a !,rroup of children with learning difficulties for comparison, which is why I am 
writing to you. I will need to assess each child's language ability, and then ask them some 
questions about cartoon stories and a story told with puppets. To date, all of the children 
involved in my research have enjoyed taking part. 
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I have discussed my research ideas with (name of Headteacher) , who is happy for (name of 
school) to be involved. If you have any questions regarding my research, then please do 
not hesitate to contact me at the above address. 
I hope that you will agree to your child participating in my research, and I would be very 
grateful ifyou could return the tear off slip below. 
Yours sincerely 
Ms Alex Proto 
Please return this slip with your child to his/her class teacher. 
*I am happy for my child to participate in your research. 
*I would rather my child was not involved in your research. 
Child' s name: Class teacher's name: 
Date of birth: 
*Delete as necessary. 
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Dear Parent 
Appendix 2E 
Letter to Parents of Normally Developing Children 
Clinical Teaching Unit 
University of Plymouth 
4/5 Rowe Street 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
I am currently training as a Clinical Psychologist, at the University of Plymouth, and am 
conducting some research into autism. Past research has suggested individuals with autism 
do not have a ' theory of mind', which means they have difficulty putting themselves in 
someone else's shoes. I will be arguing that the standard 'theory of mind' tests used in past 
research, however, need to be simplified for individuals with autism, to allow this ability to 
show through. 
l have been conducting the main part of my research in a number of autistic schools. [ also 
need a group of children without autism for comparison, which is why I am writing to you. 
I will need to assess children's language abi lity, and then ask them some questions about 
cartoon stories and a story told with puppets. To date, all of the children involved in my 
research have enjoyed taking part. 
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I have discussed my research ideas with (name of Headteachet~ , who is happy for (name of 
choof) to be involved. If you have any questions regarding my research, then please do 
not hesitate to contact me at the above address. 
I hope that you will agree to your child participating in my research, and I would be very 
grateful if you could return the tear off slip below. 
Yours sincerely 
Ms Alex Proto 
Please return this slip with your child to his/her class teacher. 
*I am happy for my child to participate in your research. 
*I would rather my child was not involved in your research. 
Child's name: Class teacher's name: 
Date of birth: 
*Delete as necessary. 
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Appendix 3 
Verbal Ability (on the TROG) and Theory of Mind Performance 
Mean verbal age (on TROG) 
Theory of Mind Autism Learning disabled Normally developing Tasks 
' passers' ' failers ' ' passers' ' failers ' ' passers' ' failers ' 
Sally-Anne 7;2 6;2 8;2 5;5 6; l0 4;3 
Ben 6;11 5; 1 1 7;9 5;5 6;8 4;6 
Ice-Cream Man 11 ;0 6;2 7;8 6; I 6;6 6;6 
Puppy 9;0 5; 11 9;4 5;10 7;5 5; 10 
Classroom 9;0 5; ll 9;0 5;8 6·8 ~ 6; 1 
Table 1. Mean age (years; months) of ' passers' and ' failers ' in each participant group on 
each theory of mind task. 
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Appendix 4A 
Justification Question Responses and Coding 
The Ice-Cream Man Task 
Autistic subject 
l. Because that's where he was last (location) 
Learning disabled subjects 
1. Because that ' s where the ice-cream man said he would be all day (communicated 
information) 
2. That's where the ice-cream man said at first (communicated information) 
3. Because the ice-cream van was there (location) 
4. He got his money and the bus turned round to the church (story facts , nonsense) 
5. Because that's where the ice-cream man said he would be all day (communicated 
information) 
Normally developing subjects 
1. Don' t know 
2. No response 
3. John went home to get his money and the ice-cream man went to the church (story 
facts/nonsense) 
4. Because she didn' t see the ice-cream man and John go to the church (first order 
reasoning) 
5. Don' t know 
6. The ice-cream man told her (story facts nonsense) 
7. Because she didn' t hear the ice-cream man talking to him (implicit second order 
reasoning) 
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8. No response 
9. The ice-cream man was there (location) 
10. Don' t know 
I 1. Because the ice-cream man was there last, and she doesn' t know where the ice-cream 
man is (location) 
12. She didn' t hear the ice-cream man tell John be was going to the church (implicit second 
order reasoning} 
13 . She didn' t hear the ice-cream man tell him (implicit second order reasoning) 
14. She didn' t hear the ice-cream man tell John (implicit second order reasoning) 
The Puppy Task 
Autistic subjects 
1. Because she wants to keep it a surprise (deception) 
2. To hide the surprise (deception) 
3. She said to Peter she got him a toy, but she really got him a puppy (communicated 
information) 
Learning disabled subjects 
I . Because that's what she told him (communicated information) 
2. No response 
3. That's what she said to Peter (communicated information) 
Normally developing subjects 
I. She' s lying (deception) 
2. Because it was a surprise, but it isn ' t now (deception) 
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3. Because she said she's getting a toy, but she hasn' t she's getting a puppy 
(communicated informal ion) 
4. Because she told him that (communicated information) 
5. Don' t know 
6. Because she told him she' s getting him a toy (communicated information) 
7. Because she didn' t know he went down into the basement (implicit second order 
reasoning) 
8. Because she said to him she didn' t get him a puppy, she got him a toy (communicated 
information) 
9. No response 
10. Because it's a surprise (deception) 
11 . Because she told him he' s getting a toy when he had a puppy downstairs 
(communicated informal ion) 
12. Because she told him that first, but it's not really true as the puppy was bjdden as a 
surprise (communicated information deception) 
13. She told Peter he was getting a toy (communicated information) 
14. She lied to Peter and told him he' s getting a toy, but he ' s not (communicated 
information deception) 
15. That's what she told Peter (communicated information) 
16. She doesn' t know he' s found the puppy (implicit second order reasoning) 
Tile Classroom Task 
Autistic subjects 
1. Because Jane told him where it is (.\·tory facts/nonsense) 
2. Because that's where Tom put it (location) 
3. That was the first place he put it (location) 
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Learning disabled subjects 
l. She didn't tell him she' d put it in the store cupboard (implicit second order reasoning} 
2. He put it in there before (location) 
3. Because that's where he first put it (location) 
4. That's where he put it (location) 
5. Because it wasn't dry (story facts/nonsense) 
6. That' s where he put it (location) 
Normally developing subjects 
1. No response 
2. Because she saw him put it in the drawer (first order reasoning) 
3. Because he put it there and then went out to play and Jane told him (location) 
4. No response 
5. She thought Jane won' t have told him (implicit second order reasoning} 
6. No response 
7. Because she didn' t know Jane told Tom that it was in the store cupboard (implicit 
second order reasoning} 
8. Don' t know 
9. Because it' s not there (story facts nonsense) 
10. She didn' t hear Jane tell him it was in the store cupboard (implicit second order 
reasoning) 
11 . Jane told Tom and the teacher didn't hear (implicit second order reasoning) 
12. Because first his painting was in there and then he went outside (location) 
13. Because she didn' t hear Jane tell him that his painting is in the store cupboard (implicit 
second order reasoning) 
14. No response 
15. No response 
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16. Because he put it in there first then the teacher put it in the store cupboard (location) 
17. She hasn' t heard Jane talk to him (implicit second order reasoning) 
18. No response 
19. Because Jane told him outside when the teacher was inside (implicit second order 
reasoning) 
20. She didn 't hear Jane say to him that she put it in the store cupboard (implicit second 
order reasoning) 
21. No response 
22. She didn 't tell him and she doesn' t think Jane told him (implicit second order 
reasoning) 
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Appendix 48 
Number of Participants, Who Passed the Second Order Tasks, 
to Give Each Type of Justification Response 
Theory of mind tasks and Autistic Learning Normally 
justifications disabled developing 
(appropriate/ inappropriate) No. % No. % No. % 
Ice-Cream Man task 
Explicit second order 0 0 0 
Implicit second order 0 0 4 29 
Communicated information 0 3 60 0 
Location I 100 I 20 2 14 
First order reasoning 0 0 I 7 
Story facts/nonsense 0 1 20 2 1-1 
Don 't know/no response 0 0 5 36 
Puppy task 
Explicit second order 0 0 0 
Implicit second order 0 0 3 17 
Communicated information 1 33 2 67 9 50 
Deception 2 67 0 4 22 
First order reasoning 0 0 0 
Story facts/nonsense 0 0 0 
Don 't know/no response 0 1 33 2 11 
Classroom task 
Explicit second order 0 0 0 
Implicit second order 0 1 17 w 45 
Communicated information 0 0 0 
Location 2 67 4 66 3 13 
First order reasoning 0 0 1 5 
Story facts/nonsense 1 33 1 17 1 5 
Don 't know/no response 0 0 7 32 
Table 2. Number and percentage of different types of justification response, given by each 
participant group, on each second order theory of mind task. 
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Appendix 5 
Letter of Ethical Approval 
Ms K Hughes 
Tutor Phoenix 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
Clinical Teaching Unit 
University of Plymouth 
NHS TRUST 
Services for:People. with. Learning Difficulties 
Drake Circus 
Plymouth PIA 8AA · 
Our ref: AM/ajw 4 September 1998 
Dear Kay 
RE: ALEX PROTO'S RESEARCH THESIS 
As you know Alex's subjects (sorry I can't remember the current label for subjects!) have 
been selected from within educational settings. This means she has not needed to go through 
the same process of ethics committees as she would have done, had they been selected from 
health settings. 
I can therefore confrrm that I fuii.y support her work on this project, and that she has been 
careful to carry out the required steps for proper ethical scrutiny. She has kept me up-to-date 
with progress, including a copy of a letter to schools seeking permission and making 
reference to the appropriate ethics committee. She has also let me know that she will be 
seeking consent from the children and from their parents. 
I am particularly pleased to support this project on a number of fronts. Firstly, it is 
refreshing to find someone keen to research in the area of learning disabilities. Secondly, I 
am hopeful that the children will enjoy participating and thirdly, there are potential long term 
benefits in increasing our understanding of Autism. 
Please let me know if you need any other information. 
Kind regards. 
Yo1fs sincerely 
I rv\1\·) 
A vril Missen 
T G d Clin. cal P h 1 . t & S . . . -
-'.>~ ood-Community Learning. Difficulties Team (CLOT) . . . . ', . . · 
;::Ircinham.Road, Kingswood, Bristol, BS15 8PQ ·: 
:~~phone· (0117) . 967 8?00 • Fax (0117) 967.1669 . . . 
!i.fi C h:1.ir Arthur Keefe B Chief Executive David Selway 
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